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Abstract
The expansion of U.S. military engagement in Africa is based on American
national security interests. The objective of this research was to add to existing
evaluations of the U.S. Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM) by taking an indepth look at its impact through a case study of Tanzania and sought to answer three
questions: What is the impact of AFRICOM on executing U.S. national security policy in
Tanzania? To what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity
in Tanzania? What is the public perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian
public? To answer these questions this assessment utilized secondary source materials,
content analysis of Tanzanian newspapers and an online discussion forum, and interviews
with U.S. officials.
This analysis found that AFRICOM is more of a traditional combatant command
than the whole of government command articulated at its inception, and primarily
emphasizes military-to-military partner capacity building. The evidence shows that
AFRICOM has a positive impact on U.S. national security policy in Tanzania, but fails to
address human security matters, and the Tanzanian public has a largely negative view of
the U.S. military organization. These findings suggest a closer look at policy
implications for American relations with other states in the region.
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Chapter One
--Introduction

Traditionally U.S. foreign policy goals have centered on national interest and
realism, economic development, and more recently the responsibility to protect. Though a
change began in the late 1990’s, in the aftermath of September 11th U.S. foreign and
security policy underwent a paradigm shift wherein weak and failing states were seen as
posing threats equal, and indeed more chronic, to those of the militaries of strong states to
international and U.S. national security. As detailed by Patrick (2011) this shift in threat
perceptions in the U.S. and the broader international community are based on two
propositions. First, traditional conceptions of security should be expanded to include
cross border threats driven by non-state actors, activities, or forces (such as pandemics or
environmental degradation). Second, that these cross border threats largely originate and
emanate from weak and failing states in the developing world.
In his seminal book on the topic, Patrick (2011) challenged this newly emerged
consensus through an empirical analysis of the connection between state failure and
transnational threats, examining the threats of terrorism, transnational crime, WMDs,
pandemic diseases, and energy insecurity. His analysis finds that that a paradigm wherein
weak states are the locus from which international security threats emanate is not
1

corroborated empirically and that, as a whole, these states do not pose significant threats
to the United States. Patrick (2011) also posits that, in addition to being cognizant of the
tenuous links between state fragility and transnational security threats, the U.S. needs to
be more strategic in its approach towards fragile states; focusing on preventing
governance deterioration, reevaluating its development policy, and avoiding an over
militarization of relations with fragile states.
After the end of the Cold War and throughout the 1990's, the U.S. struggled with
defining Africa's security and strategic significance. Having been viewed primarily in
humanitarian terms, the bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar
es Salaam Tanzania, in August 1998, led to a reevaluation among analysts and policy
makers of the strategic importance of the region.
The reconceptualization of threats to transnational and U.S. national security and
strategic interests, as detailed by Patrick (2011), brought America’s long-standing
strategic disinterest in the African continent into sharp relief. Through the lens of weak
and failing states as a threat to U.S. security, Africa could no longer be viewed as a
peripheral, humanitarian concern (Whelan, 2007). The 2002 United States National
Security Strategy devoted a page and a half to Africa in the regional overview section,
substantially more than any other region. And the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy
page 37 stated, “Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of
this Administration.”
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Within the defense community there was a growing belief that the separation of
responsibilities for Africa among three combatant commands (Pacific Command, Central
Command, and European Command) and the uncoordinated and peripheral attention
resulting from the arrangement, was unsustainable. This view largely stemmed from the
fact that Africa had steadily begun consuming more time and attention of the three
commands which were responsible for it. For example, former EUCOM Commander
General James L. Jones, said in 2006 EUCOM’s staff were spending at least half their
time on African issues (Ploch, 2011). Yet it was not until policymakers viewed African
security threats as congruent with overall global threats to U.S. security and strategic
interests, that this reorganization and new focus was considered necessary.
On February 7, 2007 President Bush announced the creation of the U.S.
combatant command for Africa, known as USAFRICOM, stating
“This new Command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa
and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in
Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security
to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health,
education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa” (White House News,
2007).
The creation of AFRICOM, and the reasons articulated for its creation, signaled a
clear shift in the security consciousness of the U.S. in the wake of September 11th. The
growing view that “Extreme poverty, ethno-religious divisions, corrupt and weak
governance, failed states, and large tracts of ‘ungoverned space’ combine to offer what
many experts believe to be fertile breeding grounds for transnational Islamist terror”
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(Berschinski, 2007, p. 5), reconfigured Africa’s strategic importance to U.S. national
security.
The U.S. Africa Command was touted by officials as being unlike any other
combatant command. It was articulated as a “combatant command plus” which,
according to Lauren Ploch (2011, p.4),
“…implies that the Command has all the roles and responsibilities of a
traditional geographic combatant command, including the ability to facilitate or lead
military operations, but also includes a broader “soft power” mandate aimed at
building a stable security environment and incorporates a larger civilian component
from other U.S. government agencies to address those challenges…In the view of
AFRICOM’s architects and proponents, if U.S. agencies, both military and civilian,
are able to coordinate more efficiently and effectively both among themselves as well
as with their African partners and other international actors, they might be more
successful at averting more complex emergencies on the continent.”

In short, the creation of AFRICOM was in response to complex security
environments, which analysts and policymakers believed required institutionalizing a
“whole of government” approach. The command’s “whole of government” emphasis was
premised on the view that interagency interoperability would create a more holistic
security policy, fostering broader security, and enhancing governance capacity and
development throughout African countries. This would, in turn, mitigate threats from the
region, primarily through ameliorating the underlying socio-economic conditions from
which many security threats stemmed. This approach was also seen as a means to
establish stronger strategic relationships between the U.S. and African states. If
AFRICOM succeeded in these efforts, it would be a significant evolution in U.S. military
engagement abroad representing a shift to one “…mindful of the complicated,
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interconnected relationships among security, governance, and development”(Berschinski,
2007, p. 1).
Prior to AFRICOM’s creation, U.S. Africa policy had settled somewhere inbetween the previous two post-Cold War policy phases: pursuing both humanitarian and
strategic objectives connected to the larger Global War on Terror (Lawson, 2007).
Though some Africans were apprehensive about U.S. counter-terror policies, President
George W. Bush’s emphasis on combatting HIV/AIDS and increasing U.S. development
assistance helped maintain a high level of public approval of the U.S. throughout Africa.
The U.S. had positive relations with many West African states, especially with Nigeria,
Liberia, Ghana, and Senegal. Its partners in the Sahel region included Chad, Mali, Niger,
and Mauritania. Since the mid-1990’s all of the East African states, Uganda, Rwanda,
Kenya, and Tanzania, had become close U.S. allies in Africa. All of Southern Africa,
with the exception of Zimbabwe, had become U.S. allies (Lawson, 2007).
In the half-decade since AFRICOM’s creation, the U.S. has utilized the command
in an attempt to cultivate stronger bilateral and security cooperation ties with African
states. AFRICOM’s prominence in U.S. foreign policy grew through its involvement in
executing the Libyan intervention in 2011 and Malian intervention in 2013, and its
expanding role in combating the spread of violent extremism in West Africa. In terms of
the impact on U.S. relations, LeVan (2010) notes that reactions to the announcement of
the command in Kenya, South Africa, and Botswana, among others, expressed serious
concerns that the increased U.S. military presence would result in increased terrorist
5

attacks in the region, and erode the sovereignty of African states. Some of the continents
regional organizations also quickly developed unified positions against AFRICOM. For
example, the fourteen country South African Development Community (SADC) issued a
statement which stated that, “sister countries of the region should not agree to host
AFRICOM and in particular, armed forces, since they would have a negative
effect”(“Notes following International Relations, Peace and Security Cluster media
briefing,” 2007).
However, according to a Washington Post investigative article by Whitlock, since
2007 approximately a dozen air bases, primarily used for surveillance, have been
established throughout Africa including Burkina Faso, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia,
Djibouti, and the Seychelles (2012). In addition, a status of forces agreement between the
U.S. and Niger was signed in January 2013 (Harris & Hirsch, 2013), further expanding
the network of U.S. surveillance bases throughout the continent. In 2008, despite its
initially outspoken opposition, South Africa permitted the USS Roosevelt into its waters,
the first time a U.S. carrier had been allowed to do so since the end of apartheid (Ploch,
2011). These examples seem to suggest that African governments have gradually become
more receptive to AFRICOM, and the resources it can leverage for regional security
challenges.
How effective is AFRICOM? Harbeson (2011, p. 151) has argued existing
assessments on AFRICOM are deeply problematic from both an academic and policy
perspective. He states,
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“Centrally important in fashioning the terms of partnership with African
countries will be attention to the distinctive political, socioeconomic, cultural, and
geographical contours of each country and those of the regions of which they are
a part…These general characteristics of most Sub-Saharan African countries
coalesce to shape country-specific contours that must be recognized and
addressed if US foreign policy in general, and AFRICOM involvement in
particular, is to be effective…Moreover, it will become apparent that proper
characterization of these factors and their interface to establish country-specific
contours entails some wrestling with conceptual issues as well as empirical fact
gathering to an extent beyond what is often recognized in the literature at best
implicitly, if at all”.

A 2010 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) review made a similar
critique of AFRICOM’s own efforts to assess its impact, noting that “AFRICOM is
generally not measuring long-term effects of activities” and argued that, “without
assessing activities, AFRICOM lacks information to evaluate their effectiveness, make
informed future planning decisions, and allocate resources”(Government Accountability
Office, 2010, p. 2). The same review found that AFRICOM, due to personnel and
structural issues, lacked institutional knowledge of African states.

Approach
The objective of this research is to add to existing evaluations of AFRICOM by
taking a narrow, in-depth look at its impact. As one of the most significant contemporary
iterations in U.S. Africa policy, evaluations of AFRICOM’s impact will be critical to
ensuring U.S. policy towards Africa is responsive to regional dynamics and challenges.
By evaluating the command in one country, a case study affords a more comprehensive
picture of the command and its impact.
7

Tanzania was chosen as the case to examine the role of AFRICOM for several
important reasons. First, it is currently not involved in a military campaign either at home
or abroad that could potentially skew any findings on AFRICOM’s involvement with the
country. Second, Tanzania is a U.S. ally but not one of the U.S.’s first-tier priority
countries in Africa. This affords an opportunity to assess how AFRICOM is engaging
with African states that are not of immediate strategic concern but are, nonetheless, U.S.
allies and important regional actors. With an allied state it is easier to identify points of
long-standing mutual interest and cooperation, points of friction in the bilateral relations,
and changes, either positive or negative, in the bilateral relationship. Together these
aspects establish a richer foundation from which to evaluate AFRICOM’s impact.
Tanzania’s long-standing stability, history of mediating regional conflicts, hosting
large refugee populations, contributions to peacekeeping missions, and hosting of
regional and international organization such as the East African Community (EAC) and
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), make it an important actor in the
often volatile East Africa region. Tanzania is also challenged by many of the
transnational threats its neighbors face including illicit narcotic trafficking, piracy, and
terrorism. As one of the world’s poorest countries, economic development has failed to
reach the majority of Tanzanians who also suffer from the effects of poor health and
education systems, as well as the world’s 12th highest HIV/AIDS infection rate, leading
to pervasive and chronic threats to human security. A strategic U.S.-Tanzanian
relationship is critical for countering the threats Tanzania faces, and bolstering the
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country’s capacity to continue its role in addressing ongoing regional conflicts and
humanitarian crises.
Historically, the U.S. did not have strong bilateral ties to Tanzania while China,
Cuba, and Russia had strong diplomatic ties and a heavy presence in the country. Indeed,
the strength of Tanzania’s ties to these countries, and its historic role as a non-aligned and
socialist state have often placed it at odds with the U.S., with especially negative impacts
on U.S. Tanzanian military relations (Meredith, 2011). Despite these historic strains,
security cooperation with Tanzania has become an important aspect of contemporary
bilateral relations. U.S. interest in this arena stems from the 1998 terrorist bombing of the
U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam, the discovery of several Tanzanians being members of
Al-Qaeda, and the growth of Al-Shabaab and its capabilities in nearby Somalia and
Kenya (Dagne, 2010).
U.S. officials regularly cite Tanzania as an example of a positively developing
country, one that demonstrates good democratic governance and respect for human
rights. Though security cooperation and assistance have increased, humanitarian and
economic development support and assistance constitute the cornerstone of contemporary
U.S.-Tanzanian relations. According to the OECD, using 2010-11 data, the U.S. tops the
list of donors of gross official development assistance (ODA) to Tanzania (“Tanzania,”
2013). Total U.S. assistance has steadily increased in recent years, from $370.2 million in
FY 2008 to $571.892 million in FY 2012 request (Dagne, 2010).
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Tanzania is one of fifteen focus countries in the President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). It was granted $1.76 billion FY 2009 to FY 2011, making it the
largest recipient of the program (“Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Tanzania”). In
February 2008 the country was granted the largest Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) compact to date, worth $698 million, which sought “…to reduce poverty and
stimulate economic growth by increasing household incomes through targeted
investments in transportation, energy, and water”(“Tanzania Compact”). In 2010
Tanzania was named one of twenty countries in the U.S. Feed the Future (FtF) Initiative,
administered by USAID. Feed the Future is the U.S. government’s global hunger and
food security program whose primary objectives are “…accelerating inclusive agriculture
sector growth and improving nutritional status in specific countries” (Ho & Hanrahan,
2011). Feed the Future seeks to achieve its objectives in Tanzania by the year 2015.
This study seeks to answer three questions: What is the impact of AFRICOM on
executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania? To what extent has AFRICOM
addressed the conditions of human insecurity in Tanzania? What is the public perception
about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public?
To get the Tanzanian perspective, the best way to answer these research questions
would be to interview high-level military, diplomatic, and development officials from the
Tanzanian government. The purpose of these interviews would be to gather views on
AFRICOM and its impact on security in Tanzania and U.S.-Tanzanian relations, from a
Tanzanian viewpoint. The best way to gauge the Tanzanian public’s perception of the
10

command would be to conduct extensive survey work throughout the country, combining
those findings with a comprehensive content analysis of all the country’s newspapers.
Similarly, talking to numerous U.S. officials from AFRICOM and the interagency
organizations that work with the command in Tanzania would be the best way to
establish a well-rounded perspective of AFRICOM, from a U.S. vantage point. Talking to
officials from both countries, and across these sectors, would provide information critical
to answering the research questions pertaining to AFRICOM’s execution of U.S. national
security policy, and any impacts on human security.
While these methods would constitute the ideal research design, some
compromises had to be made to this project’s methodology due to issues of access to
information and personnel. This evaluation employs a qualitative mixed methods case
study methodology, and consisted of field research, content analysis of a sample of
Tanzanian newspapers and a Tanzanian internet discussion forum, and interviews with
U.S. personnel. In general, issues pertaining to security and defense are less publicly
available in Tanzania than in the U.S., and personnel in these sectors are difficult to
access.1 Research by Tanzanian academics on this and related topics is also lacking, due
to the more restricted nature of research on security issues in the country, further
compounding the difficulty of constructing a Tanzanian perspective on AFRICOM and
1

Several attempts were made to contact Tanzanian officials working on issues related to
this research project, as well as a couple of Tanzanian journalists who write on issues of
security in Tanzania, in an effort to discuss this research project with Tanzanians. None
of these requests were granted. One official gave an initial response asking what country
the author was from, when told the author was from the United States the official cut off
all contact.
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its impacts. As a result of these limitations, this research had to rely on interviews with
U.S. officials, publicly available information in the U.S. on what activities AFRICOM is
undertaking in Tanzania, and that country’s top newspapers and online discussion forum
to assess public opinion, and the dynamics of the media’s role in shaping public opinion.
The research for this study was conducted in Tanzania from September 2012 until
June 2013. The fieldwork included four parts: intensive language instruction, educational
coursework on Tanzanian news media, interviews, and living with a native Swahili
speaking host family. Field research is defined by Nachmias and Nachmias (2008, p. 257)
as “the study of people acting in the natural course of their daily lives. The fieldworker
ventures into the worlds of others to learn firsthand about how they live, how they talk
and behave, and what captivates and distresses them.” Learning Swahili served as a
critical field research component. While Tanzanians learn English in school, the vast
majority of the population does not possess the requisite proficiency to discuss political
topics easily. And as a whole, Tanzanians were willing and eager to engage in in-depth
discussions about their country. Another advantage of becoming proficient in Swahili
was the ability to listen to conversations between Tanzanians, an unobtrusive means to
gather attitudinal information and viewpoints.
Similar to the field research, Swahili language knowledge and proficiency was
vital to accurately conducting this project’s content analysis component. The Swahili
language is highly contextual. Often words have several meanings and many words, if
literally translated, do not connote the same meaning or inference in English as in
12

Swahili. Indeed, although an entire paragraph may seemingly be neutral, the use of a
particular form of the word “why?” makes the connotation negative. In addition, Swahili
has a very large and constantly evolving slang vocabulary, which even Tanzanians have
trouble keeping up with. Advanced language skills and extended time living in Tanzania
mitigated these complex translation issues and enabled the content analysis to accurately
assess and code using attitudinal metrics.
Functioning as a participant-as-observer, field research for this project consisted
of observing the everyday lives of Tanzanians, including living with a Tanzanian family,
and engaging with Tanzanians. Field research gave this analysis an understanding of the
daily lives of Tanzanians; including what political, economic, and social issues are of
greatest concern, what role they want their government to play, how do they acquire news
and information, and how they view the U.S. Currently, Tanzanian’s are deeply
concerned about the political rights of Christians vis a vis Muslims, equal economic
development, and Tanzania’s status in the East African region. At present there is also a
distinct sense, within the country, that Tanzania is at a crossroads. Many feel that it is
ready for a developmental take-off. Others believe that the country’s potential will be
stunted by a system which, they believe, only serves the needs of the elite. Overall, a
local perspective was adapted into and influenced this research; specifically the daily and
broader security concerns of the average Tanzanian.
A second level of analysis was the Tanzanian media. The approximately 350
currently registered newspapers are a central source of information for Tanzanians. Many
13

stores display the most popular newspapers each day and groups of people stand outside
the store throughout the day, reading and discussing the news. Given that newspapers
play an important role in shaping public opinion, this research utilizes a content analysis
of Tanzanian English and Swahili language newspapers and an internet news discussion
forum. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2008, p. 296), content analysis is “any
technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified
characteristics of messages”.
This analysis followed the application of content analysis, as described by
Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), by describing the attributes of the content, make
inferences regarding Tanzanian public opinion of the command, and the influence the
contents of these newspapers have on public opinion. This content analysis employed a
theme unit of analysis, qualitatively coding content as either thematically “positive,”
“negative,” or “neutral.” The method of recording for the content analysis was a
frequency system, according to Nachmias and Nachmias (2008, p. 299), this is a system
in which “every occurrence of a given attribute is recorded”. Content analysis was useful
for the purposes of this research because it allows for a large sample size, with minimal
intrusiveness. Through content analysis, this research sought to construct opinions of the
command throughout the wider Tanzanian public by gathering what information about
AFRICOM is available in the Tanzanian print media, how that information is presented
(are there any biases), and through content analysis of an online discussion forum.
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Although The Daily News is a leading newspaper and owned by the Tanzanian
government, the majority of the country’s newspapers are private. While there are not
explicit constraints on the freedom of the press and the media is not controlled by the
Tanzanian government, the law stipulates that there is freedom of the press to the extent
deemed necessary for the public good (“Tanzania: Freedom of the Press,” 2012). The
wording of the law makes it possible for the Tanzania government to act with wide
discretion in terms of what it considers “public good.” In recent year’s media watchdog
organizations have become concerned about growing intimidation and violence against
journalists. A Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index (2013) cited
Tanzania as undergoing one of the biggest declines for the year 2012, falling thirty-six
places from the prior year’s index. An August, 2013 report by the Committee to Protect
Journalists cited, “…a notable jump over historical trends…”(Rhodes, p. 3) in anti-press
threats and attacks. The report continues by citing several prominent journalists and
editors who stated that, due to personal safety concerns and fear of a publication being
shut down by the government, self-censorship was widespread in the Tanzanian press.
Freedom House (2012) corroborates these findings, citing many Tanzanian journalists
admitting to self-censoring because of ongoing arrests, threats, and assaults of journalists.
Though the media is not controlled by the Tanzanian government, current laws
still allow the authorities broad discretion to restrict media for reasons of national
security or public interests (“Tanzania: Freedom of the Press,” 2012). As a result of the
loosely regulated, often capricious, and retaliatory application of the country’s press and
15

freedom of speech laws, security issues are, largely, not a matter of public knowledge or
debate. These factors make it difficult to assess the country’s security issues and policies.
The widespread exclusion of security issues from the news and public discourse also
makes it difficult to assess public opinion on the issues related to this research topic.
Despite these issues, an examination of local newspapers from private and
government sources, and in different languages, lends important insights into existing
publically available information and the dynamics of how Tanzanian newspapers both
reflect and shape public opinion of AFRICOM. To provide a wider scope and construct a
more comprehensive picture of public opinion, a content analysis was also done of the
online discussion forum Jamii Forum. Though the Tanzanian government exerts some
control over the country’s news media, internet discussion forums grant Tanzanians a
greater freedom from government curtailment of media and free speech, and allow a
broader segment of the population to voice their opinions.
Focused interviews were conducted with three current and former high-level U.S.
officials, including two former Ambassador’s to East African states and a current
AFRICOM employee. Interviews consisted of one in-person interview, a phone
interviews, and one in which the respondent answered to the questions through email.
The interviews consisted of the following questions: How does Tanzania figure in the
U.S. strategic vision of the East African region? What are the challenges and what are the
advantages of operating in Tanzania? How, if at all, do AFRICOM’s activities in
Tanzania differ from other states in the region? Have Tanzanians articulated any concerns
16

about AFRICOM? If so, what concerns? Using a broad definition, what issues does the
U.S. view as the most pressing security concerns in Tanzania? Do you feel AFRICOM
had enhanced, hindered, or had no impact on U.S.-Tanzanian bilateral relations?
Responses served to answer the three central research questions in several ways.
By comparing information on AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania and interview
responses on what the U.S. views as the most pressing security issues in Tanzania, how
the country aligns in the U.S. strategic vision of the East Africa region, and what impact
has the command had on bilateral relations etc. it is possible to answer the questions:
what is the impact of AFRICOM in executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania?
and how and to what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human
insecurity?
If the command’s in-country activities and the responses to those questions do not
align, then there is a mismatch in the execution of U.S. national security policy in
Tanzania. If they align, the reverse is true. Moreover, responses to these questions help
illustrate whether or not human security issues constitute a core concern of AFRICOM.
Field research and content analysis were the primary means to answer the question; does
AFRICOM foster a positive public perception within Tanzania? Nonetheless, responses
to the questions about Tanzanians expressing concerns about AFRICOM and what type
of impact the command has had on bilateral relations, add further insight and are
indicative of to what extent U.S. and Tanzanian officials are cognizant of wider
Tanzanian public opinion. Though interviewees had diverse experiences and knowledge
17

regarding AFRICOM and this specific bi-lateral relationship, their interview responses
were most relevant to, and predominantly used for, the analysis in chapters three and
four. To encourage openness interviewees were granted anonymity. These interviews
proved to be vital supplements to the lack of literature on U.S. Tanzanian relations and
Tanzanian security issues.

Summary
Through a mixed qualitative methods approach, this analysis was able to develop
a well-rounded picture of AFRICOM in Tanzania, gaining a strong sense of the nature of
the command’s in-country activities and the Tanzanian public’s perceptions of the
command. Field research, enhanced by local language skills, took this research beyond
secondary sources and shaped an empathetic and in-depth knowledge of the security
challenges Tanzanians and their country face. A comparison of secondary-source
information and field research observations with interview responses helped identify
continuity and inconsistencies in U.S. policies and in-country activities. These methods
also helped to illustrate whether U.S. policies and activities were congruent with the
security threats Tanzania faces. A mixed qualitative methods approach strengthened this
research, providing a multi-faceted and in-depth look at the security challenges in a single
African state, accessing the extent to which AFRICOM addresses those challenges, and
measuring if the command is positively impacting U.S. bilateral relations by fostering
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good public perceptions. Through the use of these methods, this analysis contributes
depth and specificity to the literature on AFRICOM.
The following chapters cover these topics: U.S. Combatant Commands and the
creation of AFRICOM, a review of the policy perspectives on AFRICOM, and the most
salient traditional and human security challenges in Tanzania. Chapter three assesses
AFRICOM’s impact from the U.S. perspective. Chapter four presents the Tanzanian
perspective of AFRICOM’s impact, primarily through an analysis of Tanzanian public
opinion on AFRICOM. Chapter five draws together the main findings and conclusions of
the analysis, and offers some policy suggestions.
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Chapter Two
--Background

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe (1) U.S. combatant commands: the
impetus for their creation, their functions, and their place within the U.S. military chain
of command, including the creation of AFRICOM to illustrate the role combatant
commands play in U.S. national security policy; (2) the policy perspectives and debates
surrounding the purpose and creation of AFRICOM; and (3) U.S.-Tanzanian relations,
with a focus on the history of diplomatic and military relations.

U.S. Combatant Commands
Department of Defense Unified Geographic Commands, more commonly known
as combatant commands, form an integral part of the U.S. national security
establishment. Following the experience of fighting in World War II, and as America
prepared to confront the Soviet Union in possibly another multi-theater war, an “Outline
Command Plan” was developed in 1946 (Hodge, 2011). The 1946 command plan
established seven commands: Pacific, Far East, Northeast, Alaskan, Caribbean,
European, and the Atlantic Fleet (Hodge, 2011). The development of the command plan
was a continuation of efforts which began during World War II to achieve better planning
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and coordination throughout the military. The unified combatant command system was
an acknowledgement that the U.S. now had interests, responsibilities, and power that
spanned the globe, requiring its armed forces to have standing tasks (Watson). The
command plan proposed dividing the world into various geographic areas of
responsibility (AOR) for the U.S. military, which would each be overseen by a unified
command. Each command would be responsible for protecting U.S. interests and
executing U.S. military activities in its respective AOR.
The establishment of combatant commands was officially authorized through the
1947 National Security Act under Title X of the U.S. Code, Section161 through Section
168. The critical aspects of the code state (a) Unified and Specified Combatant
commands. With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall (1) establish unified combatant
commands and specified combatant commands to perform military missions; and (2)
prescribe the force structure of those commands.(Watson, 2011, p. 3) According to
Watson (2011, p.13) this system of unified commands are defined as each having (1)
forces from at least two military services (2) a continuing, broad mission, and (3) either a
functional or geographic responsibility.
Each command is overseen by a four star Admiral or General who is known as a
Combatant Commander. As part of the U.S. military chain of command, Combatant
Commanders report to the President and Secretary of Defense and receive extensive
oversight from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Though the Chairman of the
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Joint Chiefs of Staff has no command authority over the Combatant Commanders, it
plays an important oversight and intra-bureaucracy communication role. According to
U.S. Code X section 163 the Chairman shall (a) confer with and obtain information from
the commanders of the combatant commands with respect to the requirements of their
commands; (b) evaluate and integrate such information; (c) advise and make
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the requirements of the
combatant commands, individually and collectively; and (d) communicate, as
appropriate, the requirements of the combatant commands to other elements of the
Department of Defense (Watson, 2011).
The Unified Command Plan and the delineation of the respective AOR’s are
regularly reviewed and updated. Over time the commands in the Unified Command Plan
have changed, been absorbed into other commands, or had their respective AOR’s
changed according to U.S. security concerns, and shifts in the international strategic
landscape. Nonetheless, the geographic approach has remained the primary means by
which their respective AOR’s have been established. The main mission of commands is
to embody and execute U.S. military policy, domestically and abroad, along with the
operational instruction and command and control of U.S. armed forces (Feickert, 2013).
Combatant commands, therefore, play a central role in U.S. foreign policy.
Today’s Unified Command Plan is comprised of nine total commands. Six
commands are geographic: U.S. Africa Command(USAFRICOM), U.S. Central
Command(USCENTCOM), U.S. European Command(USEUCOM), U.S. Northern
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Command(USNORTHCOM), U.S. Pacific Command(USPACOM), U.S. Southern
Command(USSOUTHCOM) The remaining three are functional commands: U.S. Special
Operations Command(USSOCOM), U.S. Strategic Command(USSTRATCOM), and
U.S. Transportation Command(USTRANSCOM) (Watson, 2011).
Combatant commands follow what is known as a Joint Staff structure, which
consists of the following “J-codes”: J-1 Directorate of Manpower and Personnel,J-2
Directorate of Intelligence, J-3 Directorate of Operations,J-4 Directorate of Logistics,J-5
Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy,J-6 Directorate of Command, Control,
Communication, and Computer; J-7 Directorate of Operational Planning and Joint Force
Development,J-8 Directorate of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, and J-9
Directorate of Interagency Partnering (Feickert, 2013). Although there are some
variations across commands to accommodate unique missions in their AOR’s.
AFRICOM’s creation in 2007 was in response to complex security environments,
which analysts and policymakers believed required a more thoroughly institutionalized
joint, whole of government approach. Stemming from the experience of the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, this view posited that interagency cooperation and interoperability
would foster greater security, governance capacity, development and overall human
security. The nature of the security environment in Africa lent itself to the development
and application of this post-September 11th security paradigm. AFRICOM’s whole of
government modus operandi centered on cooperation and support to the efforts of the
State Department and USAID throughout Africa. This would, it was argued, create
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stronger strategic relationships between the U.S. and African states and serve U.S.
national security interests by ameliorating threats to human security and the underlying
conditions from which traditional security threats developed. If AFRICOM succeeded in
these efforts it would be a significant evolution in U.S. military engagement abroad, one
“…mindful of the complicated, interconnected relationships among security, governance,
and development”(Berschinski, 2007, p. 1).
A structural deviation, a first for the U.S. military, and presented as a
representation of how AFRICOM would truly be an interagency command, was the
designation of the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) as a

civilian position, a post equivalent to that of a deputy commander (Ploch, 2011). Other
career senior diplomats from State and USAID were slated to fill the positions of director
of outreach, senior development advisor, and director of programs for USAID (Buss et
al., 2011). Planners cited the designation of these positions for civilians as indicative that
the Command’s staff would be a model of the joint interagency approach. The
Department of Defense envisioned upwards of a quarter of AFRICOM’s total staff,
roughly 125 billets, would be from other government agencies (Bachmann, 2010). The
novelty of AFRICOM would be the inclusion of interagency personnel throughout the
command. It was argued that integrating State and USAID personnel into all levels of the
command, as opposed to just placing all interagency personnel in the J-9 like other
commands, would help AFRICOM plan and coordinate activities which achieved the
objectives of all three organizations, comprehensively addressing the root causes of
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conflict and instability. This approach was considered the hallmark of AFRICOM, what
differentiated it from other regional combatant commands, and a forward looking model
for combatant commands.

AFRICOM’s Strategic Objectives and Mission Statement
Two further points of analysis are the command’s strategic objectives and mission
statement. Table 2.1 contains AFRICOM’s strategic objective for 2008-2013
Table 2.1 Strategic Objectives


2008













2009







AFRICOM's theater strategy will support broader national efforts, in
coordination with other USG agencies, to:
Confront transnational threats to security
Counter the threats posed by WMD's, illegal arms, and narcotics
Mitigate violent conflicts
Promote Stability, Security, and Reconstruction efforts
Turn the tide on HIV/AIDS and Malaria
Strengthen democratic principles by fostering respect for the Rule of Law, civilian
control of the military, and budget transparency;
Foster the conditions that lead to a peaceful, stable, and economically strong Africa
Ultimately, AFRICOM will focus its effort on promoting the following theater
objectives:
African countries and organizations can provide for their own security and
contribute to security on the continent
African governments and regional security organizations possess the capability to
mitigate the threat of violent extremism
African countries maintain professional militaries responsive to civilian authorities
and that respect the Rule of Law and international human rights norms.
Defeat the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its associated networks
Ensure peace operation capacity exists to respond to emerging crises, and
continental peace support operations are effectively fulfilling mission requirements.
Cooperate with identified African states in the creation of an environment
inhospitable to the unsanctioned possession and proliferation of WMD capabilities
and expertise
Improve security sector governance and increased stability through military support
to comprehensive, holistic, and enduring USG efforts in designated states;
Protect populations from deadly contagions
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2010






The primary purposes of our activities can be categorized as follows
Building the capacity of partner conventional forces
Supporting capacity building of partner security forces
Building the capacity of partner enabling forces



Fostering strong strategic relationships






Conducting defense sector reform
Fostering regional cooperation, situational awareness, and interoperability
Countering transnational and extremist threats
Contributing to stability in current zones of conflict
Addressing conditions that contribute to instability
Ensure that the al-Qaida networks and associated violent extremists do not attack
the United States
Maintain assured access and freedom of movement throughout our AOR
Assist African states and regional organizations in developing the will, capability,
and capacity to combat transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, and the illicit
trafficking of weapons, people and narcotics
Assist African states and regional organizations in developing the capacity to
execute effective continental peace operations and to respond to crises
Encourage African militaries to operate under civilian authority, respect the rule of
law, abide by international human rights norms, and contribute to stability in their
respective states
Countering terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
Countering Piracy and Illicit Trafficking
Partnering to Strengthen Defense Capabilities
Preparing and Responding to Crisis
Fiscal Responsibility
Countering Violent Extremist Organizations
Strengthening maritime security and countering illicit trafficking
Strengthening defense capabilities
Maintaining strategic posture
Preparing for and responding to crises




2011






2012

2013












Source: (Ham, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013; Ward, 2008, 2009, 2010)
From the table it is evident that the command’s strategic objectives have
undergone significant changes, with the scope of AFRICOM’s objectives being
progressively narrowed over time. The 2008 posture statement heavily emphasized
interagency cooperation and a broad set of strategic objectives, including post conflict
reconstruction and efforts to address human security issues. By 2009 the scope of
AFRICOM’s objectives had already narrowed. Support to reconstruction efforts was
removed and, in general, the strategic objectives had a more military focus. 2010’s
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strategic objectives seemingly attempted to bridge the gap between 2008 and 2009.
Although the agenda was slightly expanded from 2009, for the first time interagency
cooperation was not mentioned. Traditional security threats were the dominant focus in
2011, although they retained some breadth in terms of describing how the command
would work to achieve its objectives. The strategic objectives for 2012-13 were further
narrowed, placing a clear emphasis on traditional and international security issues. It is
important to note that since 2009, interagency cooperation has not been a strategic
objective for AFRICOM.
Another area of relevance is the command’s mission statement. The mission
statement for AFRICOM helps to guide the command’s activities, and like the strategic
objectives in the posture statements, set parameters for its activities. AFRICOM’s
mission statement has undergone several iterations since the formation of the command
in 2007. The draft statement read,
“U.S. Africa Command promotes U.S. National Security objectives by working
with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and
security in the AOR. U.S. Africa Commandleads the in-theatre DOD response to
support other USG agencies in implementing USG security policies and
strategies. In concert with other U.S. government agencies and other international
partners, U.S. Africa Commandconducts theater security cooperation activities to
assist in building security capacity and improve accountable governance. As
directed, U.S. Africa Commandconducts military operations to deter aggression
and and respond to crises.” (“U.S. Africa Command,” 2007, p. 7)
In contrast, the 2012-present statement reads,
“United States Africa Command protects and defends the national security
interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African
states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military
operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a
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security environment conducive to good governance and development.” (Ham,
2013, p. 2)

Similar to the commands strategic objectives, over time the mission statement has
undergone substantial evolutions. Like the early posture statements in 2008-09 the draft
mission statement places significant emphasis on an interagency approach but lacks
specificity regarding what activities would be undertaken by AFRICOM. The 2011
mission statement, as was the case with the strategic objectives that year, completely
departs from an interagency approach and instead focuses heavily on military activities.
Indeed, the draft statement and the 2011 statement illustrate a dramatic swing in the
conceptualization of how AFRICOM would function.
It is apparent that by 2011 AFRICOM had evolved into a more traditional
combatant command, in terms of its mission and strategic objectives. The changes in the
command’s strategic objectives and mission statements together with details of
AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania reveal that the command’s activities and objectives
lack the whole of government approach envisioned when AFRICOM was established,
and in its initial operating phases. For some observers these changes in AFRICOM’s
mission statement and strategic objectives has reaffirmed their skepticism of the
command’s intentions and capabilities and, in particular, its whole of government
approach. Steve McDonald (2011) has charged that AFRICOM has been a “chameleon”
changing and shifting in response to criticisms it has encountered.
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Policy Perspectives on AFRICOM
Following the announcement of AFRICOM’s creation, some analysts and
observers feared U.S. Africa policy was undergoing militarization and its development
and diplomatic efforts and the region were being securitized (Nathan, 2009). Critics also
contended an increased U.S. military presence would exacerbate security threats, namely
terrorism, by furnishing more targets for anti-American terrorist groups from around the
world (Buss et al., 2011). Proponents (Isike, Uzodike, & Gilbert, 2008; Pham, 2007a)
viewed the creation of AFRICOM as a positive development for U.S. Africa policy,
arguing that AFRICOM corrected a long-standing problem in DoD’s bureaucratic
organization, and enabled the U.S. to give a more consistent focus to the region and foster
better relations. Together, these policy perspectives raise serious questions regarding the
role of the U.S. military in Africa, the balance amongst America’s diplomacy,
development, and defense capabilities, and the meaning of security in Africa.
To date these two perspectives dominate the literature on AFRICOM. Two works
of note in the literature are the edited volumes African Security and the African
Command: Viewpoints on the U.S. Role in Africa (Buss et al., 2011) and U.S. Strategy in
Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism, and Security Challenges (Francis, 2010). These volumes
include both the aforementioned positive and negative arguments about the command.
Another widely used source is Robert G. Berschinski’s (2007) AFRICOM’s Dilemma:
“The Global War on Terrorism”, “Capacity Building,” Humanitarianism, and the
Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa. This nuanced and balanced assessment includes
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many prescient views on the potential problems AFRICOM would face if more
traditional hard power security operations overshadowed its soft power work. Berschinski
also contributes valuable process and policy recommendations regarding the command’s
focus on terrorism in Africa. Another scholar of note is J. Peter Pham who has written
extensively about AFRICOM, noting that the command brings greater U.S. resources and
focus to Africa. The arguments and analysis in these works constitute much of the
following outline of the merits and detractions of AFRICOM.
One of the two dominant perspectives in the literature is that AFRICOM is a
necessary bureaucratic reorganization, and a new vision for addressing Africa’s and 21st
century security challenges. The other major point of contention this perspective holds, is
that AFRICOM represents a positive development because it reflects a recognition within
the U.S. government of Africa’s growing strategic significance; something that has been
long neglected. This view posits this recognition is important for U.S Africa policy;
positively influencing U.S. African cooperation, while also enhancing the capacity of
African states to address regional security issues.
Amongst those who support the establishment of AFRICOM is J. Peter Pham
(2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). According to Pham “…AFRICOM’s existence is the
recognition that the United States does have significant national interests in Africa…”
and AFRICOM will enable more sustained regional engagement; critical for both U.S.
strategic interests and effectively addressing African security challenges (Buss et al.,
2011, p. 58). For Pham (2008) and other proponents, AFRICOM is not the militarization
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of development and diplomacy or the re-appropriation of those aspects of U.S. foreign
policy to the Defense Department. Rather AFRICOM steps away from the military’s
traditional way of reacting to threats and instead focuses on conflict prevention, or phase
0 operations, creating a security environment in which development can take place.
Others have supported this view and argued that, “…AFRICOM could serve as an
instrument to create a truly secure African environment where development can thrive”
(Isike et al., 2008, p. 32). In short, for proponents AFRICOM both utilizes and
institutionalizes the lessons learned from U.S. state building efforts since the end of the
Cold War, and is the manifestation of the security-development nexus approach in policy
practice (Pham, 2010).
The vast majority of the programs which AFRICOM assumed responsibility for
were already existing security cooperation programs, previously conducted through
CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM (“U.S. Africa Command,” 2007, p. 5). Pham (2010,
2011) notes that AFRICOM is therefore more of a continuation of U.S. Africa policy than
is widely acknowledged, challenging the claim of opponents that AFRICOM represents
the sudden and radical militarization of U.S.-Africa relations. Pham also argues the
creation of AFRICOM addressed the bureaucratic gaps in U.S.-Africa policy by
replacing “…an antiquated structural framework inherited from times when the continent
was barely factored into the United States’ strategic calculus”(Buss et al., 2011, p. 62).
Overall, proponents of AFRICOM highlight the fact that the command affords the
region significantly more attention, than it had under the prior configuration, when it was
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divided between three commands. They argue this division discouraged developing and
institutionalizing expertise on Africa and resulted in policy seams, negatively impacting
the development of relations with African states and regional organizations. Among those
who share this view are Herbst and Mills (2007), who posit AFRICOM will sharpen
DoD’s focus on Africa and encourage and institutionalize expertise about Africa. Berouk
Mesfin (2009) of the Institute for Security Studies adds that a more in-depth knowledge
of Africa will lead to better informed planning for the U.S. military, and advice in the
event of crises. In addition to redressing this long-standing bureaucratic gap, proponents
claim that AFRICOM will be better able to coordinate U.S. Africa policy between
Defense, State, and USAID. This is critical for the effectiveness of their respective
mandates in Africa, as well as the complexity of the security environment in African
states (Forest & Crispin, 2009).
Proponents generally acknowledge that there were problems with the way
AFRICOM was announced and initially planned, but often argue that adjustments in U.S.
public relations regarding AFRICOM, and after seeing the command in action, African
apprehensions and objections to the command have been significantly allayed. Opponents
are not as convinced, viewing lingering skepticism and opposition as being
fundamentally about deeply-seeded African opposition to any form of imperialism, which
they view as epitomized by the creation of AFRICOM (Fah, 2010; Nathan, 2009; Otieno,
2010). A Carl LeVan (2010) has put forth an alternative hypothesis to the pervasive view
that AFRICOM’s announcement, roll-out, and subsequent African opposition were the
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result of a public relations blunder. LeVan’s research gives compelling evidence that
opposition or support of AFRICOM was based on African states foreign aid dependence,
specifically aid from the U.S. LeVan found those states with lower aid dependence being
more critical of AFRICOM, and hypothesized these states had more freedom to criticize
U.S. policy since they were less dependent on U.S. foreign aid.
The literature in opposition to AFRICOM centers on the view that the command
represents a militarization of U.S Africa policy, and a securitization of development and
diplomacy. This opposition has been succinctly summarized by Isike, Uzodike, and
Gilbert(2008, p. 34) as constituting the following,
“A significant step towards a US-driven militarisation and destabilisation
of an already conflict-prone continent…there is also concern that AFRICOM
signals a growing US securitisation of aid and development…the likelihood that
AFRICOM’s presence might actually undermine the ability of African
institutions…to address regional problems and challenges from within”.
Tynes (2006, p. 111) argues “Overall, the essential aspects of US foreign policy
can be characterised as the re-militarising of African states, the initiating of repressive
legislation, and the presence of military troops and execution of military exercises on the
African continent.” For opponents, AFRICOM demonstrates a narrow and self-serving
conception of security, one predominantly focused on terrorism, oil, and countering
China’s geostrategic ambitions in Africa (Berschinski, 2007). The focus on terrorism and
counter-terrorism is particularly troubling for some analysts (Keenan, 2010; Tynes,
2006), who contend that U.S. counter-terror efforts thwart the process of democratization
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and the growth of robust civil society in African states. And ultimately undermine the
process of development critical for stemming security threats in weak states.
The opposition viewpoint also posits that AFRICOM’s interagency approach has
been overwhelmed by the Department of Defense due to its resource superiority vis a vis
the State Department and USAID. Equally troubling for opponents is the possibility that
not only could DoD’s resources overwhelm those of State and USAID, but that this will
undercut existing U.S. economic, governance, education, health care, and humanitarian
programs in Africa, eroding the soft power aspects of U.S. Africa policy (Piombo, 2012).
Others, such as Collin Thomas-Jensen (2008), believe AFRICOM could play a positive
role in U.S. Africa policy, but addressing the shortages in U.S. civilian capacity should be
done first, in order for civilian agencies to stand on more even footing with DoD as
interagency representatives in AFRICOM. He argues the absence of comprehensively
addressing America’s civilian deficiencies, a joint whole of government approach will
never be fully realized, and a de-facto militarization will occur.
In contrast to proponents who assert that AFRICOM seeks to address a broad
range of security issues, critics charge that AFRICOM fails to recognize that human
security issues are the most vital in African states. Indeed many have based their
skepticism of AFRICOM on the belief that U.S. security interests will dominate and
marginalize the security concerns of African states. As one skeptic argued, “The crucial
point is not that the US wants to advance its interests, but that these interests do not
coincide with those of Africa and, more importantly, that the US has the means and the
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disposition to pursue its interests at the expense of African interests”(Nathan, 2009, p.
60). That the U.S. planned and announced AFRICOM largely without consulting African
leaders, is cited as evidence that the command is merely another instrument of the U.S.
Global War on Terror (GWOT), and intended to secure America’s energy, namely oil,
interests on the continent, and to check China’s rising influence in the region (Ganzle,
2011). According to Volman (2010) it is disingenuous for U.S. policymakers to suggest
that AFRICOM was not founded based on the U.S. objectives to fight terrorism, secure
energy resources, and counter China’s rise on the continent.
Gilber, Uzodike, and Isike (2009, p. 277) support this view and argue that if
human security and development issues were a core concern of the U.S. then the creation
of a military organization is not a logical option. Rather, “…AFRICOM was unilaterally
created for the furtherance and consolidation of US strategic state-centric security
interests but packaged in human security paraphernalia for the twin purposes of
credibility and acceptability by African statesmen”. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ojakorotu
(2010, p. 99) take this point further and argue that addressing terrorism and its
connections to state fragility is not, fundamentally, about the security of African states.
They state, “The main weakness of the argument that connects weak states with global
terrorism is that the security of Africa itself is not emphasised. What is emphasised is the
security of the Western and American nations.”
In short, for the majority of opponents, African security is fundamentally about
human security. For these opponents U.S. and African security interests cannot converge
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through the establishment of AFRICOM because it is a military organization. As a
military organization, AFRICOM signifies a fundamental “…dissonance between US
strategic security concerns on the continent and the issues that constitute the African
security predicament” (Isike et al., 2008, p. 22). Salih (2010, p. 91) urges analysts to
looks beyond the benefits AFRICOM would bring to the militaries of African states and
regional organizations, and instead focus on human security stating, “…human rather
than military security is what would deliver peace and security to Africa”. These analysts
believe U.S and African security interests can converge, if they are each based on the
need to enhance human security,
“…by furthering mutually articulated partnerships aimed at deepening
democracy and building capacity for good governance as well as increasing aid
and foreign direct investment, writing off debts, halting environmental
despoliation and finding a cure for HIV/Aids”(Isike et al., 2008, p. 24).

Tanzanian Security Issues
Despite chronic poverty, since independence Tanzania has played a leading
diplomatic and political role in East Africa. In contrast to neighboring Kenya, Tanzania’s
independence in 1961 from Great Britain was achieved through a largely peaceful
political process, under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. Since independence Tanzania
has held the distinction of being generally stable and capable of maintaining an
impressive degree of social harmony and cohesion, even though it has roughly one
hundred and twenty-five different ethnic groups (Dagne, 2010). Its stability and
consistency in following a morally based foreign policy have won respect from the
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international community and allowed Tanzania to make “…important non-economic
contributions to the international system out of proportion to its economic
muscle”(Waters, 2006, p. 46).
Soon after independence Tanzania assumed an active foreign policy and presence
in the international community. Nyerere positioned Tanzania as a non-aligned state in
Cold War politics (CIA, 2011), through his founding role in the non-aligned movement.
The country was an early and ardent supporter of the anti-apartheid movement and, at the
expense of its own economic interests, it led an economic boycott against South Africa,
and offered strong support to other independence movements in the region (Waters,
2006). Nyerere’s stature as a statesmen and the vision he articulated for Tanzania, and
Africa as a whole, made Tanzania a central member of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU). His leadership was instrumental in developing these dynamics in Tanzania’s
foreign policy, dynamics which have persisted until today.
While Nyerere’s principled style of leadership and foreign policy garnered
international praise and admiration, under his leadership Tanzania suffered disastrous
economic decline. At the time of independence in 1961 Tanzania was poor, but its
economic prospects were promising and the country’s leadership decided to continue
with the capitalist economic model instituted during colonialism (Ngowi, 2009). Between
1963 and 1983 Tanzania became the “darling” of the international aid community and
was one of the world’s largest recipients of aid (Edwards, 2012). Central to Tanzania’s
receipt of international aid was widespread international praise and attention of the
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honest, idealistic, and humble leadership of Nyerere. Edwards (2012, p. 20) notes that
admiration for Nyerere and the impact it had on the World Bank’s unquestioning support
and supply of aid was dubbed “the cult of Tanzaphilia”.
However Nyerere’s announcement of the Arusha Declaration in February 1967
had instituted sweeping changes in the country’s economic philosophy and policies. The
Arusha Declaration stated that Tanzania would pursue an indigenous African socialism
he termed, ujamaa (Meredith, 2011). Moreover the capitalist, market oriented economic
model inherited from colonization would be transformed into a centrally planned and
state owned model (Ngowi, 2009). The Arusha Declaration stemmed from Nyerere’s
concern that Tanzania’s reliance on foreign aid and perpetuation of a capitalist economic
system was leading to the erosion of traditional and communal values and incentives for
promoting development.
Ultimately the economic policies of the Arusha Declaration proved to be a
disaster for the country’s economic growth and development. The hostile policies
towards the private sector, which stemmed from the Arusha Declaration, led to its virtual
demise, leaving the public sector almost wholly responsible for the country’s economy
(Ngowi, 2009). The economic consequences were stark. By the end of the 1970’s
Tanzania’s trade deficit was continually rising. In 1975 the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank had to rescue the government from financial collapse.
Agriculture, the lynchpin of Tanzania’s economy, dropped by 10% from 1979-1982, and
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between 1977 and 1982 the national output as a whole declined by one-third, as the
population’s standard of living dropped by 50% (Meredith, 2011).
In 1981 Nyerere conceded, “We are poorer now than we were in 1972”(Meredith,
2011, p. 258). Tanzania’s shocking economic decline represents one of the most dramatic
declines in a country that has not experienced major war or internal conflict. By 1991
Tanzania was the second poorest country in the world, dramatically falling from its
previous position of twenty-five in 1976 (Edwards, 2012). Reluctantly Nyerere
acknowledged the failure of his economic policies, and began to institute reforms with
the assistance and support of the IMF and the World Bank. Successive Tanzanian leaders
have taken steps, although often haltingly, to institute capitalist and market-oriented
economic reforms and liberalize the economy as a whole (CIA, 2011).
Although it suffered severe economic decline throughout the 1970’s and ‘80’s
Tanzania maintained an active foreign policy agenda. In addition to actively supporting
independence movements in the region and staunchly opposing South Africa’s apartheid
regime, it played a leading role in attempts to address growing conflict and instability in
African Great Lakes states and became a safe haven for refugees in the region. In 197879 the country single-handedly repelled an invasion by Uganda’s Idi Amin and, with a
force of 45,000 troops, ousted his brutal and repressive regime (Meredith, 2011).
Tanzania’s international reputation was bolstered in the 1990’s when it hosted the
world’s largest refugee population and played a leading mediation and negotiating role to
disputes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. After the
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Rwandan genocide Arusha, Tanzania was chosen as the location for the UN Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda. Because it has been the site of numerous regional mediation efforts
the city of Arusha is often called the “Geneva of Africa”(Waters, 2006). Today Tanzania
continues to have good relations throughout the region and to demonstrate its
commitment to regional integration and cooperation. It is the only state which is a
member of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development
Community (SADC). Through participation in these organizations Tanzania has worked
towards regional development, economic and trade cooperation, and security policy
coordination.
Participation in the EAC and SADC, combined with a disciplined fiscal policy,
has yielded stable economic gains that displayed resilience in the midst of the global
economic downturn. From 2009-2012 the country experienced GDP growth rates
averaging above 6.5% and is projected to hit growth rates of 7.1% in 2013 (African
Development Bank Group, 2012). Increased gold mining production, and the recent
discovery of natural gas deposits that could as much as triple Tanzania’s estimated
reserves, have led to speculation that Tanzania is poised to become a major regional
economic force (Sanders & Moseley, 2012).Yet Tanzania’s macroeconomic gains have
largely failed to change the economic conditions for the majority of the country’s
population which still has an overall poverty rate of 34%, with the absolute number of
people classified as poor rising by 1.3 million from 2001-2007 (African Development
Bank Group, 2012) .
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Traditional Security Concerns
Though it has enjoyed overall internal peace and stability, Tanzania faces
significant threats to transnational and human security. In terms of transnational security
threats, Tanzania faces terrorism, piracy, and increasingly pervasive illicit narcotics
trafficking. The continuation of these security issues will have an increasingly
destabilizing impact on Tanzania, jeopardizing the country’s stability and development
gains, with deleterious implications for East African, and U.S. security interests. .

Terrorism
The 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi turned
the U.S. government’s attention to the presence and lethality of the terrorist, specifically
Al-Qaeda, threat in Africa. Following the September 11th attacks the Eastern and Horn of
Africa regions gained further prominence. Concerns were heightened when Kenya was
again targeted by terrorists in 2002. Furthermore, the realization of the scope of the threat
posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and its linkage to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
pushed the U.S. to focus a significant portion of U.S. counter-terror policy on the East
and Horn of Africa regions (Ploch, 2010).
Kenya has become the U.S.’s dominant partner in its Horn and East Africa
regional counter-terror strategy. Tanzania has become a tier-two focus country, as the
U.S. seeks to prevent the spread of terrorism, while simultaneously working to support
and encourage the country’s economic and political stability (Vittori & Bremer, 2009).
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The Tanzanian government has, to a great degree, cooperated with U.S. counter-terror
efforts in the region. The government implemented the Prevention of Terrorism Act of
2002. In 2006 it passed the Prevention of Money Laundering Act which created new
banking and anti-corruption laws. The Tanzanian police have created a Counter-terrorism
Unit, and in 2007 the government established a National Counterterrorism Centre
(Whitaker, 2010). Tanzania also participates in the East African Counterterrorism
Initiative (EACTI) through which it has received computers at border entry points, a
forensics laboratory, and a new laser technology passport system (Whitaker, 2010).
While Tanzania enhanced its counter-terror efforts, the current extent of the
terrorist threat in Tanzania is somewhat ambiguous. Since the 1998 bombing of the U.S.
embassy Tanzania has not experienced another high casualty terrorism incident. The
1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy was a mutually eye-opening experience for
Tanzanians. Their long-held sense of security and freedom from the violence in
neighboring states was sharply questioned. Although the Tanzanian government has
demonstrated a significant degree of cooperation with counter-terror efforts in the region,
the absence of terrorism incidents has seemingly, over time, diminished the government’s
perception of a terrorist threat. Research by Elise Whitaker (2010) has shown the
Tanzanian government’s lack of implementation and compliance with the provisions of
various U.S. and international counter terror efforts highlight both the diminished threat
perception and other domestic political issues. Indeed, during his 2005 presidential
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campaign and throughout his presidency Kikwete has rarely mentioned the issue of
terrorism (Whitaker, 2010).
Nonetheless, the country is still viewed by the U.S. as susceptible and vulnerable
to terrorism. The U.S. State Department’s 2011 Terrorism Report on Tanzania
acknowledges that the country has not experienced any major terrorist incidents, but
continues by saying “Inter-agency representatives of Tanzania’s National
Counterterrorism Center…still consider diplomatic missions, foreign investment projects,
and tourist areas targets for terrorist attacks”(United States Department of State, 2012a, p.
33). U.S. fears of terrorism in Tanzania are largely due to its geographic proximity to
states that experience significant terrorist activity, namely Kenya and Somalia, and its
internal conditions which the U.S. views as conducive to terrorism. These include: porous
borders, poor security service capacity, corruption, availability of technology and
weapons, and significant numbers of Western targets. William Rosenau (2005, p. 1) has
argued that the pervasive nature of these conditions in Tanzania make it “…ideal for
conducting terrorist operations”.
However, field research done by Rosenau (2005) indicates that the adoption of
Salafist or Wahabbi Islamic ideology has not taken root in a substantial portion of the
country’s Muslim population which, as a whole, has been resistant to radicalization.
Although Tanzania’s lack of state capacity is a critical component to terrorist activity and
recruitment, the population seemingly lacks that political orientation and mobilizing
ideology necessary for recruitment and participation in terrorist groups.
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While existing research is skeptical about the recruitment capacity for terrorist
organizations, Rosenau (2005, p. 6) notes that, “ Heavy-handed government attacks on
Muslim communities, the lack of economic opportunity, and growing political frustration
may in the future prove to be more fertile material for exploitation by terrorist recruiters”.
Conversations with Muslims in Zanzibar and the Tanzanian mainland revealed that all of
the aspects Rosenau highlights as being conducive to recruitment into terrorist
organizations are acutely felt by Tanzania’s Muslims. Many Muslims, despite the fact
that the country’s President and most of the top leadership are Muslims, feel they are
politically excluded and economically disadvantaged vis a vis Christians. At present it
appears as though there are rising tensions between Muslims and Christians. Indeed the
February, 2013 assassination of a Catholic priest in Zanzibar, the May, 2013 bombing of
a Catholic church in Arusha serve as the most recent prominent examples that religious
tensions are on the rise throughout Tanzania.
As the preceding analysis revealed, concerns over mainland Tanzania’s links to
the global jihadist network, potential to become a safe haven, recruiting ground, and
target for radical Islamic terrorism are tenuous. However the issue of terrorism in
Zanzibar differs from mainland Tanzania (Ousman, 2004). The threat of terrorism in
Zanzibar is connected to the broader issue of a growing separatist ideology for separation
from Tanzania, breaking the union (“muungano” in Swahili) established in 1964, which
merged Tanganyika with Zanzibar.
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Since the era of German colonialization until today, Zanzibar’s close economic,
cultural, and ethnic ties to Arab states has led to an isolationism that is both externally
and self-imposed. There is a deeply entrenched sense and clearly perceptible view
amongst Zanzibari’s and mainland Tanzanians that the “Arab” Zanzibari’s are separate
from the “Africans” of mainland Tanzania. The islands inhabitants still maintain strong
links to Arab states and welcome their investments and influence. Since the 1980’s
wealthy individual donors from Gulf States have funded mosques, madrassas, health
clinics, secondary schools, teachers training colleges, and universities in Zanzibar
(Turner, 2009). Saudi Arabia is also estimated to contribute close to $1 million a year to
the building of new mosques and madrassas (Vittori & Bremer, 2009). They have also
funded scholarships for study abroad trips for young Zanzibari men to Saudi Arabia and
Sudan. Two of the three universities in Zanzibar are Islamic and funded by Kuwaiti and
Saudi Arabian donors with faculty from Sudan and Pakistan (Turner, 2009). In 1992
Zanzibar announced that it was joining the Organization of Islamic States (OIS), despite
the fact that the Tanzanian government was not a member of the organization. The
resultant uproar over the announcement induced the Zanzibari government to withdraw
its application (Vittori & Bremer, 2009). The Zanzibar government’s solidarity with Arab
states, and willingness to counter the political stance of the mainland to do so, is
indicative of its divergent political views and agenda.
Any discussion about politics with Zanzibari’s will quickly turn into an
indictment of mainland Tanzania’s government, and how it intentionally and
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systematically marginalizes Zanzibar politically and economically. Conversations with
Zanzibari’s also reveal deep-seeded antagonism towards mainland Tanzania, much of
which stem from Zanzibar’s history as a prosperous slave trading island. It is not
uncommon to hear Zanzibari’s remark about how they are superior to the “African”
mainland Tanzanians and to support their claim of superiority by pointing out how they
once sold the “Africans” as slaves. Zanzibari’s also utilize language as a means to denote
a separation with the mainland. Despite being a semi-autonomous region Zanzibari’s
refer to Zanzibar as an “nchi” (“country” in Swahili) and are perturbed if it is pointed out
to them that, in fact, Zanzibar is not a country but part of Tanzania. One American
expatriate whom has been living in Zanzibar for over three years remarked to the author
that the desire of Zanzibari’s to break the “muungano” has dramatically grown since she
arrived.
Combined these historical and cultural narratives, language syntax, and views on
contemporary politics have created a pervasive underlying narrative throughout
Zanzibar’s population and society. This narrative essentially states; Zanzibar is
historically and culturally superior so the mainland works to suppresses Zanzibar and its
economic development. If Zanzibar was free of the mainland it would regain the
prosperity it enjoyed during the days of the slave trade. The combination of this narrative
of disenfranchisement, the grievances regarding Zanzibar’s economic development
status, and the desire to break the union with mainland Tanzania and create strong links

46

with Arab states, form a potentially troubling confluence of factors for future stability and
security.
In 2001 a non-governmental Islamic charity organization commonly known as
UAMSHO (“awakening” in Swahili) was officially registered with the Zanzibar
government as a non-governmental organization, claiming to advocate for Muslim rights
and unity (Turner, 2009). However over the last couple of years the organization has
progressively evolved into an Islamist political party, and seemingly is seeking to
cultivate a broader political movement. UAMSHO’s rise as a political force can be
attributed to the opposition political party Civic United Front (CUF) agreeing to a power
sharing agreement with the dominant Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and forming a
Government of National Unity (GNU) following the 2010 general election. The power
sharing agreement was intended to mitigate the electoral violence that had characterized
Zanzibar’s elections since the islands first multiparty elections in 1995. Persistent
electoral violence had reached the point of threatening the island’s political and economic
stability (Kagaruki, 2013).
In its new political role UAMSHO has called for the dissolution of the union with
mainland Tanzania, restrictions on alcohol sales and consumption, the imposition of a
dress code for foreign tourists, and uses rhetoric which feeds resentments towards
mainland Tanzanians and the government (“Contagion of discontent; the Swahili coast,”
2012). As UAMSHO has assumed a more political role increasing violence has been
associated with the organization. In October 2012 Zanzibar was wracked by the third
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incident of violent protests connected to UAMSHO in 2012 when three days of violence
broke out after a leader of UAMSHO went missing. Supporters alleged that he was
kidnapped and detained by government security forces. Zanzibar’s security forces denied
that they were at all connected with his disappearance.
Discussions with Zanzibari’s about UAMSHO reveal there is widespread support
for the group’s political views, insistence on maintaining the island’s conservative
culture, and willingness to challenge the government. Although there was distaste for the
group’s participation in violence, it didn’t appear to diminish support for the group’s
overall goals and ideology. These events and the support for the group point to
UAMSHO and the views it espouses as a growing force to be reckoned with in
Zanzibar’s politics and society, and could ported the use of violent tactics in the future.
Of particular concern to both the U.S. and Tanzanian governments is the potential
use of terrorist violence. Zanzibar does have prior connections to terrorist activity. Three
suspected bombers involved in the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam
and Nairobi were from Zanzibar (Brents & Mshigeni, 2004). In 2001 a U.S. court
convicted Khalfan Khamis Mohamed of participating in the attack and Ahmed Khalfan
Ghailani has been indicted and included on the FBI’s most wanted list (Brents &
Mshigeni, 2004). There is some controversy over to what extent Zanzibari’s have
participated in terrorist activity either domestically and internationally post 9-11. After 911 there were some reports that leaflets were being distributed in Mosques throughout
Zanzibar seeking volunteers to join Al-Qaeda. Zanzibar authorities said they investigated
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locals traveling abroad to see if they had plans to travel to Afghanistan and they
reportedly found no Al-Qaeda recruits (Lacey, 2002). These claims by local authorities
are somewhat dubious given that some Al-Qaeda terrorists in Yemen have been identified
as Zanzibari’s (Vittori & Bremer, 2009).
At present the evidence does not support that a radical Islamic ideology is
widespread in Zanzibar. Nonetheless the deeply ingrained sense of marginalization and
relative deprivation grievances vis a vis mainland Tanzania felt by the majority of
Zanzibaris, and the growing sentiment of the need to break the union with the Tanzanian
mainland, provide potential fertile ground for radical ideology to take root and for the
use of terrorist tactics to precipitate. Should radical ideologies take root Zanzibar’s status
as a Western tourist destination would ensure any potential terrorist activity would have
ample targets and opportunities at its disposal.

Drug Trafficking
Drug trafficking through Tanzania and the East African region is a newly
emerged security threat. The United Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has noted a
startling upward trend in the flow of drug trafficking in East Africa, most notably heroin,
from South and Southeast Asia (UNODC, 2009). An intra-regional trafficking also exists
among Tanzania, Madagascar, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles and the Comoros. Tanzania
is a vital transit state in these trafficking routes and its population is increasingly
becoming consumers of these drugs. Tanzania’s geography plays a central role in this
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problem. As a result of sharing borders with eight other states, a 1,424 kilometer Eastern
coastline, and highly porous borders, Tanzanian authorities are struggling to combat the
trafficking of narcotics in and out of the country (United States Department of State,
2012) Large shipments of heroin from Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and cocaine from
Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru are increasingly being reported and seized in Tanzania (United
States Department of State, 2012b) . In one major seizure in Tanzania in December, 2010
authorities captured fifty kg of heroin (Basar, 2012).
There are also troubling signs the drug trade in Tanzania is becoming
internationalized, with Tanzanians increasingly being seized in other countries in
connection with drug trafficking. Two Pakistanis were arrested as a result of a seizure in
February, 2012. Of fifty-five individuals charged in Tanzania with serious drug offenses
in 2012, nearly a third were foreign nationals (United States Department of State, 2012).
The transnational aspect of this problem is not simply foreign nationals coming to
Tanzania. Many Tanzanians are now being caught abroad in connection with drug
trafficking. In early 2004 the Chinese Xinhua News Agency reported thirty-two
Tanzanian nationals were caught in connection with the illegal drug trade in nine
countries; including 13 in Pakistan and others in Kenya, Germany, India, Ethiopia,
Britain, Uganda, Mauritius, and the UAE (Xinhua News Jan 7, 2005). UNODC data on
the nationalities of those arrested in Pakistan for drug trafficking shows Tanzanians
represent the third highest nationality of those arrested, preceded by Pakistanis and
Nigerians (Basar, 2012).
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The impact of drug trafficking in Tanzania is, perhaps, most troubling in
Zanzibar. Zanzibar’s connections to producer states and European consumer states have
made it an attractive transit point into the broader trafficking routes. The tiny airport in
Zanzibar has direct flights to Oman and other Gulf States as well as Italy. This allows
drugs to be fed directly from producer states into the Western drug consumption chain
(Butcher, 2000). The fact that Zanzibar’s airport was privatized in 1998 has added to
these fears, and many believe privatizing has made drug trafficking easier (Butcher,
2000) and recent police busts of drug trafficking activities support concerns regarding the
airports role. In March, 2013 police discovered a network of drug dealers using the
airport, including four airport employees. A Greek national in transit to Italy was arrested
in connection to the syndicate and 5 kg of narcotics were seized with a value over $200
million (“Zanzibar officials in drug traffic network face music,” 2013). From January to
March, 2013 six individuals, three of which were foreign nationals, were arrested at
Zanzibar’s airport in connection with drug trafficking (“Police ‘bust’ Zanzibar drug
dealers’ network,” 2013). In addition to modern transportation connections to drug
producing states, security at official ports is almost non-existent and corruption at these
ports is rampant (Vittori & Bremer, 2009). Zanzibar’s State Minister in the First VicePresident’s office has stated that the illegal ports along the coast are proving to be
problematic for stemming drug trafficking (“USA Donates Two Boats to Tanzania Antidrugs Fight,” 2012).
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When looking to the current impact of drug trafficking in West Africa,
particularly Guinea-Bissau, it is readily apparent that a poor state such as Tanzania can be
severely undermined by this illicit activity. Already there are significant structural
weaknesses which impede the Tanzanian states capacity to comprehensively address this
growing threat. The corruption that comes hand in hand with drug trafficking is eroding
fragile state structures (Basar, 2012). Tanzania’s stability is critical for this volatile
region. The undermining of the already fragile Tanzanian state has obvious implications
for security that extend to the East Africa region as a whole.

Piracy
Beginning in 2004 an escalation in pirate activity off the Horn of Africa and
originating from Somalia alarmed observers. The explosion of pirate activity in 2008-09
made piracy a dominant international security issue. Piracy’s impact on international
security centers on economic and energy security, with piracy in the Horn and East
Africa regions directly impacting world shipping markets (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). Sea
borne trade is vital to the global economy having quadrupled over the past 40 years, with
90% of international trade and two-thirds of petroleum dependent on sea transport (“A
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” 2007). As of 2008, “Twenty thousand
ships transit the Gulf of Aden annually…carrying 12 percent of the world’s daily oil
supply…”(Kraska & Wilson, 2009, p. 55). The proximity of the Gulf of Aden to the Horn
of Africa states makes it a tempting target.
52

While international attention focuses on contemporary piracy being a
phenomenon of the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden, it has also significantly impacted
East African states. In 2008 out of the two-hundred and ninety-three reported pirate
attacks or attempts worldwide, one-hundred and twenty-five took place in East Africa
(UNODC, 2009).Tanzania, in particular, has suffered from the threat of piracy. The
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) between 2001 and 2008 recorded 58 pirate attacks
in Tanzania, with 34 of those attacks taking place between 2006-2008 (Nincic, 2009, p.
4). During these years Tanzania incurred the third highest number of piracy attacks in
Africa (Nincic, 2009, p. 2). That the vast majority of attacks in Tanzania have been
perpetrated by Somali pirates demonstrates the reach of the threat.
Since 2008 through 2012 the IMB (2013) has recorded only eight pirate attacks in
Tanzania with no incidents reported in 2011. The IMB attributes this impressive drop in
pirate attacks to increased regional naval patrols, the widespread adoption of best
practices throughout East Africa, and political will to mitigate the threat of piracy. As a
member of SADC Tanzania has benefitted from naval assistance from South Africa
which has committed naval assets to patrol throughout Tanzanian waters as well as in the
Mozambique Channel (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2013). Despite these
important steps the director of the IMB has warned that unless these deterrent and best
practice measures continue, piracy attacks in Tanzania could re-escalate and Tanzania is
still vulnerable to piracy and its extensive negative impacts on the state’s security (ICC
International Maritime Bureau, 2013).
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Human Security Issues
Terrorism, illicit trafficking, and piracy pose significant threats to Tanzania and
transnational security. However threats to human security in those and other issue areas
pose serious, and even more pervasive and chronic security challenges for Tanzania. The
UNDP’s Human Development Index, which measures various indices of standards of
living, access to education, and health, ranks Tanzania in the low human development
category placing it at 152 out of 187 countries (UNDP, 2011). As one of the world’s
poorest countries, Tanzanians face threats to their human security on a daily basis,
creating path dependencies which threaten the country’s overall security and stability.
Though the human security paradigm can incorporate many issues, this analysis will
focus on the economic and health aspects of human security in Tanzania.
Drug trafficking. From a human security viewpoint the impact of drug trafficking
through Zanzibar on the islands population is striking. Recent figures place Zanzibar’s
population as having amongst the highest per capita heroin addiction rates in the world,
with an estimated 9,000 addicts on the small island (“Zanzibar Plagued by Growing
Heroin Addiction,” 2012). Particularly hard hit is the young adult population. The
infiltration of drugs is also tearing at the social fabric of Zanzibar’s predominantly
Muslim population, and many older Zanzibari’s fear Zanzibar’s traditional Muslim
beliefs and culture in Zanzibar are being eroded. Though drug use is on the rise
throughout Tanzania, it is readily apparent in Zanzibar. As Zanzibar’s development
languishes behind mainland Tanzania’s, the loss of the health and productivity of a vital
54

segment of the population bodes poorly for future growth and development. Leaders on
both the Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar have openly acknowledged the growing
domestic illegal drug consumption rates are troubling for future growth and development
(“Tanzania; Prayers for Kikwete’s Anti-Drugs War,” 2006). Yet Tanzania has significant
structural and political impediments to comprehensively addressing this growing
problem. Foremost among these issues is police capacity (United States Department of
State, 2012).
Piracy. Less noted as a security threat stemming from piracy are the threats to
human security. The ripple effects from these impacts have far-reaching implications for
Tanzania’s already fragile economy, including the economic security of Tanzanians who
incur higher costs of living. The UNODC (2009) also notes piracy’s intersection with
other criminal activities which threaten human security including arms trafficking and
human trafficking. For states like Somalia whose populations rely heavily on
international humanitarian aid, piracy can disrupt the delivery of humanitarian aid and
supplies. The disruption of these supplies is not only an economic loss to providing
states, but exacerbates humanitarian emergencies. The impact on an already tenuous, at
best, human security environment is immediately felt.

Economic Security
As detailed in the background of Tanzania, the country’s post-independence
economic policies had a disastrous effect on the country’s economy and development.
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Through extensive reform efforts which began in the mid-1990’s Tanzania has steadily
reversed the negative consequences of Nyerere’s African Socialism economic policies,
and has achieved economic growth. Yet the economy remains highly donor dependent,
which accounts for 30% of the country’s budget (CIA, 2011). The economy also lacks
overall global competitiveness with a ranking of 120 out of 144 by the World Economic
Forum’s global competitiveness index (World Economic Forum, 2012).
Aside from a feeble national economy the vast majority of the population still
faces chronic economic insecurity, particularly in rural areas. A comparison of
Tanzania’s GDP (PPP) per capita to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa reveals that
Tanzania’s, at $553, is significantly below the composite regional average (World
Economic Forum, 2012). The country’s overall poverty rate remains high, with the most
recent household budget survey finding the current rate at around 34% and the
percentage of people who suffer from hunger at 16% (African Development Bank Group,
2012). In addition to persistent poverty and economic insecurity there is also a sizeable
economic inequality gap in Tanzania. A common measurement used to gauge a country’s
inequality in wealth or income is the GINI coefficient which utilizes a scale from 0 to
100, with 0 expressing perfect equality and 100 showing maximum inequality. In 2007
the World Bank’s development indicators placed Tanzania’s GINI coefficient at 37.6
(“GINI Index,” n.d.).
Much of the economic insecurity experienced by Tanzanians is a result of the
country’s weak education system. At first glance it would seem Tanzania’s education
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system is impressive for a poor state, it has high primary education enrollment rates
reaching 95.9% on the mainland and 83.6% in Zanzibar with near gender parity (“UNDP:
Tanzania Millennium Development Goals,” 2010). The recent gains in primary education
have moved Tanzania into the twenty-seventh position in the world for enrollment rate
(World Economic Forum, 2012). Yet these high primary education enrollment rates have
not translated into progressive gains in secondary and university education rates.
According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (2012) the
quality of primary education in Tanzania’s is poor, ranked 114th in the world, and
secondary and university education enrollment rates are among the lowest in the world,
each ranked at 137th . The passage rates for the national secondary education
examinations are abysmal. In 2012, 65% of students failed the exam (Mwakyusa, 2013).
The education system is failing Tanzanians, stunting their ability to ensure their
economic security and create a stronger and more dynamic national economy.

Health Security
Another major human security issue in Tanzania is health security. Overall life
expectancy at birth remains low at 57 years (UNDP, 2011). According to World Health
Organization (WHO) statistics in most categories Tanzania has worse health outcomes
than the regional averages (World Health Organization, 2006). The most recent statistics
show malaria infection rates at roughly 26,000 per 100,000 in the population and
tuberculosis cases 177 per 100,000 (World Economic Forum, 2012). Threats to maternal
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and child health are particularly troubling in Tanzania. The infant mortality rate is 78 per
1,000 live births, maternal mortality ratio 1,500 per 100,000 live births, and an under-five
mortality rate of 126 out of 1,000 (World Health Organization, 2006). Data indicates the
percentage of births attended by a skilled physician on the mainland is only around 50%
(African Development Bank Group, 2012).
Healthcare expenditures consume a significant portion of the income of
Tanzanians. According to the World Bank in 2010 Tanzanians paid 41% out-of-pocket
private expenditures and 13.6% out-of-pocket in total expenditures on health (“Out-ofpocket Health Expenditure,” n.d.). Using significant portions of income for health
expenditures exacerbates the already precarious economic security of many Tanzanians.
One of the primary concerns for Tanzania’s health security is HIV/AIDs. With the
12th highest infection rate globally, Tanzania is one of the countries most affected by the
HIV/AIDs epidemic. Declared as a national disaster by the government in 2000, by 2003
the infection rate was placed at around 8.3%, translating to 1.6 to 2 million infected
persons (Dagne, 2010). Due to the government’s adoption of a national policy on
HIV/AIDS in 2001 and aggressive action by the international community, Tanzania’s
HIV/AIDS infection rates have stabilized and slightly decreased. Nonetheless, UNAIDS
places the current number of Tanzanians living with HIV/AIDS at 1.6 million, the
prevalence rate at 5.8%, and the number of orphans due to HIV/AIDS aged 0 to 17
between 1.2 to 1.4 million (“United Republic of Tanzania,” 2011).
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The HIV/AIDS epidemic has serious implications for human security in Tanzania.
Research has demonstrated that HIV/AIDS; drops life expectancies, and hollows out the
professional class and the most economically productive segments of a population,
resulting in potentially destabilizing youth bulges. High HIV/AIDS rates also contract
GDP growth, impacts household incomes and livelihoods worsening poverty, eroding
communities and their social fabric, with disproportionately negative impacts on women
and girls (Cuddington, 1993). In poor states like Tanzania, these factors place extreme
pressure and strain on already fragile health and social security systems and services
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2006; Cuddington, 1993).

Summary
Combatant commands play a central and vital role in the execution of U.S.
national security policy in their respective AOR’s. AFRICOM’s creation signaled a
significant shift in the conceptualization of Africa’s strategic significance to the U.S. and
its joint, whole of government modus operandi represented a concurrent shift in the
conceptualization of U.S. national security policy. The views of both proponents and
opponents of AFRICOM have validity. The purpose of this assessment will be to
examine if either proponents or opponents are correct about AFRICOM in the context of
Tanzania.
In the case of Tanzania there are various benefits and limits to how the command
can address Tanzania’s security issues. The Tanzanian government faces a chronic
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shortage of resources, which has a serious impact on its ability to address these complex
security challenges. In this regard AFRICOM is beneficial for addressing Tanzanian
security issues because of the resources it can bring. Indeed, training and logistics are
crucial components to addressing the country’s traditional security issues and these are
important resource contributions AFRICOM can make. The limits of AFRICOM’s ability
to address Tanzania’s security issues stem from the fact that it is a military organization.
As a military organization AFRICOM lacks the institutional culture, knowledge, and
mandate to holistically address human security issues. Though this was intended to be
remedied through the integration of interagency personnel, shortcomings in this regard
significantly limit the commands ability to address human insecurity.
Likewise, there are benefits and limits to how AFRICOM will be able to address
U.S. security interests in Tanzania. One important potential benefit for U.S. security
interests will be that AFRICOM can help develop better institutional understanding of the
country’s security dynamics. An important benefit for both the U.S. and Tanzania is the
single point of contact a combatant command provides, mitigating the communication
complexities and policy execution seams that were a factor in the regions prior
trifurcation amongst combatant commands. Another benefit of AFRICOM for both
Tanzania and the U.S. is that it corrects a bureaucratic imbalance. And given that Africa
has traditionally occupied the back waters of U.S. strategic concerns, the allocation of
more resources and policy attention could create better strategic engagement with
Tanzania, serving both U.S. and Tanzanian security interests.
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Because of the continuity of AFRICOM’s strategic objectives and mission
statement over the course of the last couple of years, it is unlikely that the style or
substance of AFRICOM’s engagement with Tanzania will be significantly altered for the
foreseeable future. In his final testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee
former AFRICOM Commander Gen. Carter Ham (2013, p. 2) singled out the command’s
relationship with Tanzania stating, “We are deepening our relationship with the
Tanzanian military, a professional force whose capabilities and influence increasingly
bear on regional security issues in eastern and southern Africa and the Great Lakes
region”. This statement indicates AFRICOM is satisfied with its current form of
engagement with Tanzania, and the outcomes to date. This assessment will determine
whether or not the terms of engagement are, in fact, beneficial for both U.S. and
Tanzanian security interests.
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Chapter Three
--The U.S. Perspective on the Impact of AFRICOM

Introduction
This assessment has three central research questions: what is the impact of
AFRICOM on executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania? To what extent has
AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity in Tanzania? What is the public
perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public? The aim of this chapter is to
address the questions regarding impacts on U.S. national security and human insecurity.
To do so, this chapter will give an overview of the commands current activities in
Tanzania, and a brief analysis of how those activities impact human security challenges.

The Impact of AFRICOM on U.S. National Security Policy in Tanzania
In his 2008 Senate testimony AFRICOM’s first Commander Gen. Ward stated,
“From inception, AFRICOM was intended to be a different kind of command designed to
address the changing security challenges confronting the U.S. in the 21st century” (Ward,
2008). When AFRICOM was announced it was presented as a new and innovative
“combatant command plus.” Officials stated that it would depart from the traditional
personnel structure for combatant commands. This departure would include the
62

integration of high level civilian officials, in addition to a greater proportion of
interagency personnel distributed throughout the command, working side by side with
military planners, logisticians, and operations personnel. These structural changes were
intended to be a reflection of how AFRICOM would be a combatant command which
embraced the concepts of “new jointness” and “whole of government.” As chapter one
detailed, the shift to joint, whole of government operations was a direct result of U.S.
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hodge (2011, p. 212) has argued that “Africa was
the new laboratory for ‘getting it right,’” to demonstrate the lessons learned from those
conflicts, and be the poster child for the next generation of DoD theatre engagement.
Former AFRICOM Commander Gen. Carter Ham’s March 2013 testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee (2013, p. 2) highlighted U.S. AFRICOM’s
engagement with Tanzania, and the country’s role in regional security. He stated, “We
are deepening our relationship with the Tanzanian military, a professional force whose
capabilities and influence increasingly bear on regional security issues in eastern and
southern Africa and the Great Lakes region.” Currently Tanzania is eligible to participate
in twelve of AFRICOM’s security cooperation programs and exercises, and participates
in ten. Table 3.1 lists these programs and exercises, those it participates in, and
descriptions of each.

Table 3.1 Tanzania Participation in AFRICOM
Programs and Exercises
Security
Cooperation
Programs and
Exercises

Description
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Tanzania
Participation

Africa
Partnership
Station
MEDCAP

AMLEP

IMET

Partner
Military
HIV/AIDS
Pandemic
Response
Program

National
Guard State
Partnership
Program
VETCAP

ACOTA

Cutlass
Express
Eastern
Accord

The focus of APS is to build maritime safety and security by
increasing maritime awareness, response capabilities and
infrastructure.
The Medical Civil Action Program enhances partner nation
health care capacity and reduces the threat of disease by
collaborating with local medical professionals, interagency
partners and local authorities.
The African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership
(AMLEP) program enables African partner nations to build
maritime security capacity and improve management of their
maritime environment through combined law enforcement
operations.
The International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program provides funds for international personnel to attend
U.S. military professional training programs. The IMET
program exposes foreign students to U.S. professional
military organizations and procedures and the manner in
which military organizations function under civilian control.
The objective of PMHAP is to support capacity building and
development of HIV/AIDS policy within African militaries
and to assist African partner military’s leadership with
reducing the yearly incidence of HIV in their militaries.
In partnership with the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the Pandemic Response Program
(PRP) assists African militaries to develop influenza
pandemic response plans that are integrated into their
country’s overall national response plans.
The State Partnership Program is a key U.S. security
cooperation tool that facilitates cooperation across all
aspects of international civil-military affairs and encourages
people-to-people ties at the state level, building relationships
that enhance global security, understanding and cooperation
VETCAP, the Veterinary Civil Action Program, delivers
veterinary programs in support of strategic military
objectives.
ACOTA provides a full range of peacekeeping training and
instruction tailored to match a country’s needs and
capabilities. The program focuses on sub-Saharan African
soldiers from partner nations who are scheduled to
participate in a peace support operation.
Exercise Cutlass Express focuses on addressing piracy
through information sharing and coordinated operations
among international navies.
Eastern Accord is a military exercise focusing on
humanitarian aid/disaster response with East African nations
and designed to help participants improve their capability to
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X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

Natural Fire

respond to regional security threats posed by Violent
Extremist Groups and to more effectively counter the
associated Violent Extremist Ideology.
The objective of Natural Fire is to prepare Eastern African
countries and U.S. forces for combined peace support,
humanitarian civic assistance, and disaster relief type
operations.

X

Source: (“United States Africa Command,” n.d.)
This table proves illustrative regarding U.S. national security policy in Tanzania,
as well as to what extent the Tanzanian government’s security concerns converge with
those of the U.S. Regarding the command’s impact on U.S. national security policy, that
AFRICOM has been able to maintain a high degree of cooperation from Tanzania in the
programs and exercises for which it eligible, is indicative that it is successively executing
U.S. national security policy. Indeed, if the primary objective of U.S. national security
policy in Africa is building partner capacity in order for African states to assume the
primary responsibility for regional security (Warner, 2013), high levels of participation in
the programs and exercises offered by the U.S. is critical to the degree of impact and
success of U.S. policy. The evidence from this table indicates AFRICOM is having a
positive impact on U.S. national security policy in Tanzania.
The high degree of cooperation in the programs and exercises for which it is
eligible also signals a convergence of U.S. and Tanzanian security interests. This is
important from both a U.S. policy and Tanzanian security perspective. It is important for
U.S. policy to be reflective and responsive to the security challenges African states face,
in order for the U.S. to build strong strategic partnerships and mitigate security threats.
Tanzania’s high degree of participation signals that AFRICOM is not only executing U.S.
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national security policy, but that U.S. policy is addressing threats which are of
importance to the Tanzanian government.
Focused interviews were conducted with three current and former high-level U.S.
officials, including two former Ambassador’s to East African states and a current
AFRICOM employee. The interviews consisted of the following questions: How does
Tanzania figure in the U.S. strategic vision of the East African region? What are the
challenges and what are the advantages of operating in Tanzania? How, if at all, do
AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania differ from other states in the region? Have
Tanzanians articulated any concerns about AFRICOM? If so, what concerns? Using a
broad definition, what issues does the U.S. view as the most pressing security concerns in
Tanzania? Do you feel AFRICOM had enhanced, hindered, or had no impact on U.S.Tanzanian bilateral relations?
Interviews with U.S. personnel revealed a generally positive perception of the
command’s impact in Tanzania, both in executing U.S. national security policy and
ameliorating the country’s security challenges. In general, interviewees attributed
AFRICOM’s successes in Tanzania to the overall strengthening of U.S.-Tanzanian
bilateral ties, which has occurred throughout the past two U.S. and Tanzanian
administrations. One former Ambassador to Tanzania noted that, beginning with
President Mkapa and continuing with President Kikwete, Tanzania has been receptive
and pursued a closer bilateral relationship with the U.S. He felt the two countries
currently enjoy a generally positive relationship with one another, due to Mkapa and
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Kikwete’s pro-American stances and increased development aid, security cooperation,
diplomatic exchanges, and high-level symbolic gestures from the U.S.
Recent U.S. diplomatic gestures from include President Bush’s visit to Tanzania
in 2007, making him the first U.S. President to visit Tanzania. Later, the first African
head of state to meet with President Obama was President Kikwete of Tanzania. The
significance of these gestures was not lost on Tanzanians. A former U.S. Ambassador to
Tanzania felt these moves went a long way to solidifying recent gains in bilateral
relations. In his view, Tanzania is now one of U.S.’s closest partners in Africa. A current
AFRICOM employee working in the region also noted that Obama’s subsequent three
country tour of Africa in 2013, and the inclusion of Tanzania on the itinerary, is further
indication of the stature the U.S. accords the country and the growth in bilateral relations.
Another former ambassador to a neighboring country noted these diplomatic overtures,
emphasizing U.S. interest in Tanzania as tied to its geostrategic significance to the
regional economy.
The former Ambassador to Tanzania also felt the country’s recent pro-American
pivot had also been reflected in the country’s military relations. The former Ambassador
recalled that, soon after becoming president, Kikwete expressed a desire for Tanzania to
play a more active role in regional peacekeeping missions. As a result, he sought to build
the capacity of the country’s military, and moved fairly quickly to enhance military ties
and promote those in the military with links to the U.S. Historically, Tanzania’s military
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ties had been with the Soviet Union and China. This created culture institution problems
for Kikwete’s attempts to strengthen military ties to the U.S.
In explaining the difficulties these historic ties created in U.S.-Tanzania militaryto-military relations, he cited one example of a former commander of the Tanzanian
military, the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Force (TPDF). This commander had received
his military education and training from the former Soviet Union. Consequently he was
hostile to the idea of the U.S. and Tanzanian militaries having a significant degree of
cooperation, not even allowing U.S. military vessels in Tanzanian ports. Efforts to
enhance military ties with the U.S. were, for a time, delayed by this commander. After his
retirement Kikwete immediately filled the position with someone who was proAmerican.
According to the former U.S. Ambassador, U.S. military and diplomatic
personnel were shocked by the overnight positive change this effected in U.S.-Tanzanian
military relations. While this may have had a positive impact of military-military
relations, the AFRICOM employee cast doubts on whether this had led to a drastic
change in the degree of engagement between the two militaries. Indeed this person felt
that AFRICOM has had a positive impact on bilateral relations, especially because recent
U.S. counter-piracy efforts have been important for protecting the commercial viability of
the Dar es Salaam port. But when asked to characterize the nature of AFRICOM’s
activities in Tanzania, the response was “expanding, but not robust.”
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According to the former U.S. Ambassador, during his tenure Tanzania’s
leadership became gradually more aware of how AFRICOM and U.S. security
cooperation and assistance could aid their efforts to become more active in regional
security issues. He recalled the African Union’s 2008 intervention in Comoros as a
critical point for AFRICOM in Tanzania. According to this official, during the Comoros
intervention he and other high-level U.S. officials in Tanzania pointed out to their
counterparts how AFRICOM played a beneficial role to Tanzania during the intervention;
stressing that a command for Africa demonstrates respect. In his experience, Kikwete
seemed receptive to AFRICOM, and receptivity to the command was slowly growing in
the military and government by the end of his tenure. This interviewee also recalled how
U.S. officials became fully aware of the positive role AFRICOM could play, in terms of
serving as a single point of contact for coordination and assistance for African states and
regional organizations. Nonetheless, when the AFRICOM employee was asked the
question, “Using a broad definition, what issues does the U.S. view as the most pressing
security concerns in Tanzania?” he singled out counter-piracy and stopping the spread of
Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab further into Tanzania, signaling that the command’s primary
emphasis is on traditional security concerns.
Both the table illustrating Tanzanian cooperation in AFRICOM programs and
exercises and the interviews point to AFRICOM having a positive impact on U.S.
national security policy in Tanzania. Tanzanian participation in most of AFRICOM’s
activities means the command is successfully fulfilling its role in executing U.S. security
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policy. The evidence also suggests that since it is now a single point of contact, the
command has made it easier for military and diplomatic personal to both coordinate and
leverage the resources of the U.S. military in U.S.-Tanzanian relations. Moreover,
interview responses indicating President Kikwete’s growing receptivity to AFRICOM
indicate that AFRICOM could not only be positively impacting U.S. national security
policy in Tanzania, but also regionally. As President Kikwete seeks for Tanzania to play
a greater role in East African security, his receptivity to AFRICOM bodes well for the
command’s impact that the policies it seeks to execute.

The Impact of AFRICOM on Human Security in Tanzania
Three of the ten programs and exercises Tanzania participates in (Cutlass Express,
Eastern Accord, and the Africa Partnership Station) focus on more traditional security
issues, namely terrorism and maritime security. While the focus of these programs is
predominantly on terrorism and maritime security they utilize a capacity building
approach with a traditional focus on military training, professionalization, and logistics
training. Five of the security cooperation programs, focus on issues that are not strictly
military. These programs (MEDCAP, Partner Military HIV/AIDS, Pandemic Response,
and VETCAP) span a diverse range of issues including veterinary medicine and public
health issues, including influenza pandemics and HIV/AIDS. The exercise Natural Fire
focuses on humanitarian civic assistance and disaster relief. These programs and
exercises illustrate that AFRICOM is engaging with issues related to human security. In
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terms of interagency cooperation, three of the programs Tanzania participates in are
interagency; ACOTA and IMET (Department of State), and Pandemic Response
(USAID).
While security programs and exercises constitute the core of AFRICOM’s
activities in Tanzania, the literature and interviews also periodically brought up
AFRICOM’s involvement in school and well building projects in Tanzania. There is no
evidence that these are a consistent or an integral aspect of the command’s activities.
Typically these activities were conducted by civilian affairs teams from the Combined
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Moreover a 2010 review of CJTF-HOA
civilian affairs teams and their work in East Africa found that there was a lack of sociocultural and language training for these teams, a poor understanding of how their work fit
within the larger whole of government approach, and remarkable discrepancies in how
the personnel in civilian affairs teams understood the mission of their work (Farrell &
Lee, 2010).
Nonetheless, both the former ambassador to Tanzania and AFRICOM employee
emphasized traditional transnational threats as the locus of the command’s objectives and
activities. Though the ambassador mentioned a couple instances of humanitarian related
work in Tanzania, such as a vaccination drives, both he and the AFRICOM employee
heavily emphasized the commands role in preventing the spread of violent extremism and
maritime security.
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AFRICOM’s integration of interagency personnel and its funding sources provide
another key insight into the command’s impact on human insecurity in Tanzania. Without
interagency personnel pushing for the command to address human insecurity and the
command lacking the personnel expertise and funding necessary to leverage human
security as a priority, the command will focus predominantly on traditional security
issues. Though the Defense Department originally envisioned having upwards of a
quarter of AFRICOM’s staff comprised of interagency personnel, roughly 125 billets,
meeting this target has proven to be difficult (Ploch, 2011). According to a former
AFRICOM official, of the Commands approximately 1,500 personnel only forty are
interagency and of those fifteen are from the intelligence community, therefore only
twenty-five are true interagency personnel (anonymous, personal communication). These
low numbers of interagency personnel are supported by a Government Accountability
Office (GAO) review (2010) of AFRICOM. That review compared interagency personnel
numbers in 2008 and 2010 and found that the total in 2010 had increased to twenty-seven
from thirteen in 2008, but overall the percentage of interagency personnel was still only
at 2%, far short of the original goal of 25%. It was argued that AFRICOM’s ability to
address and mitigate human insecurity would stem from the integration of significant
numbers of interagency personnel throughout the command.
Indeed, a former AFRICOM official felt that the lack of interagency personnel
resulted in the command formulating plans which were not truly whole of government
(anonymous, personal communication). GAO interviews with interagency personnel
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found that AFRICOM is not always involving other federal agencies in the formative
stages of activity planning, and does not fully leverage expertise of interagency personnel
embedded at AFRICOM. Some stated they have to work to insert themselves into
meetings at the command and ask what they can do to contribute, rather than being
actively and eagerly utilized by command leadership and personnel (Government
Accountability Office, 2010, p. 35). These observations from former personnel and
official statistics demonstrate that AFRICOM’s integration of significant numbers of
interagency personnel remains unfulfilled. That this integration has not occurred provides
insight on the command’s ability to impact human security. Without interagency
personnel, AFRICOM lacks the requisite expertise and the institutional momentum
required to prioritize human insecurity in its activities.
Another factor complicating the ability for the command to address human
insecurity in Tanzania is its funding sources, which directly steer AFRICOM towards
addressing traditional security issues. The command has to juggle twenty-two different
funding sources, many of which have varying time horizons and restrictions on the terms
of their use (Warner, 2013). Further compounding the coordination of AFRICOM’s
funding sources, according to AFRICOM’s director of strategy, plans, and programs
Major General Charles Hooper at a March, 2013 roundtable on Civil Affairs at George
Mason University, is the fact that many of these funding sources are designated for
counterterrorism. Major General Hooper stated that coordinating and managing these
diverse funding sources is incredibly complex due to the need to identify what funds can
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go to what programs and what countries. As Warner (2013) notes the complicated nature
of AFRICOM’s funding sources makes it difficult for the command to engage in longterm planning interagency planning, and to align its activities with the priorities of
partner African states. Without funding that is specifically designated with a whole of
government approach in mind the command is hampered in its ability to plan and
integrate activities that address human security.
AFRICOM could do more to impact both U.S. national security policy and human
security in Tanzania if it engaged in security sector reform. According to Major General
Charles Hooper, the director of AFRICOM’s strategy, plans, and programs, Africa’s size
and the diversity of its threats have led to the command developing four subordinate
regional campaign plans, rather than the standard single theatre campaign plan used by
other combatant commands. The East Africa campaign plan entails combating violent
extremist organizations (VEO’s) through bi-lateral and multinational efforts and security
sector reform once Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda are defeated.
The sequencing in the East African campaign plan is flawed. Combatting and,
ultimately, defeating violent extremist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Al Shabaab in
East Africa is dependent on an effective security sector, particularly a well-trained police
force. On this point this researches findings diverge from current literature, positing that
AFRICOM needs to engage with the security sector in Tanzania, specifically the police,
which is in desperate need of training, education, and reform. Similar to most African
states, Tanzania’s police are poorly trained, equipped, and insufficiently resourced.
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Weaknesses in the country’s security sector exacerbate both traditional and human
security threats.
Research by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) found, on average, Tanzanian
police officers receive only six months of training and the Tanzanian Police Force (TPF)
suffers from a lack of effective record keeping, and a slow moving legal system which
hampers police work. ISS also found poor public opinion of the TPF largely due to
extreme delays in investigations and the TPF’s dismissive attitude towards sexual and
gender based violence. Lacking special services and training the police generally tell
victims of sexual and gender based crimes they should be handled as a family matter
(Robins, 2009). Afrobarometer’s survey results in Tanzania help further illustrate the low
degree of public trust in the country’s police. When asked about how much they trust the
police 13% said “not at all,” 25% “just a little,” and 35% “somewhat.” When asked about
how many police where involved in corruption only 5% said “none,” while 48% “some,”
and 27% “most of them” (AFROBAROMETER, 2008).
The deficiencies of the TPF have wide ranging and every day implications for
security of Tanzanians. Currently, AFRICOM is not allowed to train foreign law
enforcement personnel under Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Under current
rules AFRICOM would need to be given a special waiver. Despite AFRICOM having
stepped back from the “Combatant Command plus” model, an exception allowing the
command to engage in police training and professionalization would directly impact
development outcomes and the overall status of human security in Tanzania.
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Better community policing is critical for addressing terrorism and drug
trafficking, transnational treats which heavily rely on local law enforcement solutions. As
Warner (2013, p. 12) notes, “Left unaddressed, U.S. restrictions on funding police reform
will be a gaping hole in U.S. interagency efforts to build partner security capacity in
Africa”. Reform of the TPF will help mitigate threats to Tanzania’s stability and security
and, by extension, U.S. interests. Without SSR security capacity building efforts in
Tanzania are incomplete. A better trained and professionalized police force also helps
human security, especially gender based and sexual violence which are also vectors for
the spread of HIV/AIDS and cause other health risks. Moreover, better trained and
resourced police forces improve overall community security and prevent the
establishment of extra-judicial, mob justice practices and institutions.

Conclusion
AFRICOM is having a positive impact on U.S. national security policy in
Tanzania, signified by the generally high degree of engagement the command has
cultivated with Tanzania. The country’s high degree of participation in the command’s
security cooperation trainings and exercises means U.S. security policy is being executed.
Interviews also highlighted the positive impact the consistent focus and single point of
contact AFRICOM affords U.S.-Tanzanian bilateral relations
Regarding the question of the command’s focus on human security issues, the
details of AFRICOM’s in-country activities in Tanzania reveal that, in practice,
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AFRICOM’s concentration on human security and development issues falls far short of
the scope and degree articulated by officials during, and immediately following, the
creation of AFRICOM. Additional evidence regarding the command’s minimal impact on
human security in Tanzania can be found in the low number of interagency personnel
AFRICOM has integrated, and direction in which the command’s funding drives its
activities. This evidence supports the views of opponents. This is not to say AFRICOM
does not at all engage in these types of activities in Tanzania. Several of its security
cooperation programs and exercises do focus on humanitarian and public health issues,
and civilian affairs teams periodically perform development related work. It can also be
argued cooperation and engagement with the Tanzanian military and civilian affairs
teams interacting and working with local populations are a form of diplomatic functions,
which help cultivate stronger bilateral ties. Indeed, interviewees all indicated that they
felt the command had helped create stronger bilateral ties with Tanzania.
Yet it is important to note how all of the programs and exercises which focus on
non-traditional and are interagency are focused on the military. For example, the
HIV/AIDS program works on prevention and treatment of the disease within the
Tanzanian military. Therefore, although there is topical breadth and interagency
cooperation, the target of AFRICOM’s focus remains on the Tanzanian military and
traditional security issues. While not diminishing the importance of these efforts, the
available information on AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania and interview responses
shows a clear emphasis on a more traditional conception of security, rather than human
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security. This evidence of AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania call into question the
command’s whole of government approach and, overall, supports the views of opponents
of AFRICOM.
The truth AFRICOM has faced is that the U.S. does not have the personnel
necessary to meet the demands and mandates of civilian agencies, let alone divert
significant numbers to a new military combatant command. Hodge (2011) notes that
AFRICOM’s interagency structure and whole of government modus operandi was
premised on an assumption that it would be able to command the requisite military,
diplomatic, and conflict prevention resources. One of the officials interviewed by Hodge
(2011, p. 227) even stated,
“The supposition that we are making here is that the whole-of-government
interagency planning and framework has been cured, there have been the proper
structures built in terms of a special coordinator for reconstruction and
stability…the requisite expertise in terms of Civilian Response Corps—additional
subject matter experts that are almost like an interagency reserve force—have
come online”.
AFRICOM was created with a vision of what U.S. government security and state
building capabilities would be like as a result of experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet
these new resources and bureaucratic reconfigurations were not a reality for AFRICOM
to incorporate and utilize.
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Chapter Four
--The Tanzanian Perspective on the Impact of AFRICOM

Introduction
To what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity in
Tanzania? What is the public perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public?
This projects chief research questions focus on the impact of AFRICOM on U.S. national
security policy in Tanzania, to what extent the command is addressing threats to human
security in Tanzania, and the Tanzanian public’s perception of the command. To help
answer these questions, this chapter details the most salient security threats in Tanzania,
and the results of a content analysis of the country’s most prominent newspapers and an
online discussion forum. The aim of this chapter is to present evidence from the
Tanzanian perspective that will be central in answering these research questions.

Public Perceptions about AFRICOM among Tanzanians
When AFRICOM was announced it generated sudden, often visceral, reactions
from leadership within African states, and their citizens. Some African countries, notably
South Africa and Nigeria, had their newspapers filled with angry assertions that the U.S.
was seeking to put its military in African states and that AFRICOM was but the final
iteration of U.S. neo-colonialism. Ultimately the ability for AFRICOM to execute U.S.
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military and foreign policy in Africa is dependent upon the acceptance of African heads
of states. If public opinion in African states is adamantly opposed to AFRICOM, leaders
are less likely cooperate and engage with the command and U.S. Africa policy will
languish. For this reason, in-depth knowledge of public opinion in African states is
critical for the command; ideally shaping the command’s priorities, approach, and
outreach efforts.
Assessing public opinions also lends important insights into whether Africans
view AFRICOM as serving their security or merely U.S. security interests, helping to
highlight areas where the U.S. can adjust and alter its Africa policy. With these issues in
mind this analysis compares and contrasts perceptions of AFRICOM in popular
newspapers and social media sources in Tanzania to gain a better understanding of how
the Tanzanian public views AFRICOM, and the manner in which news sources are
informing those views.
For this assessment five of the most popular newspapers in Tanzania were chosen.
The two English language publications chosen were the Citizen and Daily News. The
remaining three, Mwananchi, Tanzania Daima, and An-nuur (an Islamic newspaper) are
Swahili language publications. Each publication’s website, with the exception of Annuur, was searched to find articles about AFRICOM. All Africa.com, a website which
compiles and archives articles from African publications, and Lexis Nexis were also
searched to see if there were additional articles that did not appear in a search of the
publications’ websites. An-nuur’s articles on AFRICOM were pulled from a Lexis Nexis
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search of the BBC’s Global Monitoring Service. In these searches three opinion pieces
written by Tanzanians, but not published in the five selected publications were also
found. These three opinion pieces were included and coded because they represented
Tanzanian views on AFRICOM and the restrictions on freedom of speech may have
made it impossible for them to be published in Tanzanian newspapers.
The search resulted in sixty-five articles. Articles were then qualitatively
evaluated and coded as either being positive, negative, or neutral. To be coded as positive
an article generally had to positively remark about AFRICOM’s engagement and
activities or how it was impacting U.S. Africa relations. An example of phrasing that led
to an article being coded as positive is,
“a recent symposium to engage academic professionals held in Dar es
Salaam whose expertise includes history, political science, security studies, civilmilitary relations and conflict management, demonstrated the role of Africom in a
non-militaristic approach to resolve some of the chronic problems facing the
continent, notwithstanding the state of anarchism in Somalia” (Mjasiri, 2012)
To be coded as negative an article negatively remarked about AFRICOM and its
activities, priorities, and its impact on U.S. Africa relations. Examples of the kind of
phrasing that led to an article being coded as negative are:
“there in America, newspapers publish maps of the ten places in the world in
which the military currently is. These areas indeed show that America goes where
it can get what it needs, like oil and minerals. This, indeed, is the geography of
imperialism (trans)” (Visram, 2012)
“We do not have to wait for the prophet to come down and tell us that
welcoming the United States Army to set up an Africom base in Africa is opening
the doors to colonialism (trans)” (“President Karume should leave office in peace
without selling off Pemba,” 2010)
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Neutral meant either the article was a news report or no bias could be detected.
An example of phrasing that led to an article being coded as neutral is, “The US Africa
Command (Africom) has assured that there are no immediate plans to establish its
headquarters on the continent and has instead called for improvement in regional
cooperation among African armies” (Mtambalike, 2012). Roughly 64% of the sixty-two
articles were coded as being negative, 34% as neutral, and 1% positive.
A closer look at the distribution and origins of the coding results provides
interesting insights into origination points of Tanzanian opinions of AFRICOM. Daily
News is an English language newspaper owned by the Tanzanian government. None of
the nine results from Daily News were coded as negative, one was positive and the
remaining eight were coded as neutral. By comparison the Citizen, a privately owned
English language publication, four of the fifteen articles were negative, eleven were
neutral, and none were positive. The search of Tanzania Daima resulted in only two
articles, one negative and one neutral. The eleven Mwananchi articles on AFRICOM
were all coded as negative. Mwananchi is owned by the same company as the Citizen but
published in Swahili. Similarly the Islamic Swahili language newspaper An-nuur had
twenty-two of its twenty-five results categorized as negative with the remaining three
being neutral.
An even clearer picture emerges when these results are disaggregated. Articles
from the government owned Daily News were fewer in quantity than other sources,
overwhelmingly neutral about AFRICOM, and contained the only positive article. The
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privately owned Citizen had more articles and was more likely to be negative.
Importantly, criticism of AFRICOM was overwhelming more likely to be in Swahili
language publications. In English language publications 16% of the articles were
negative, if the three opinion pieces by Tanzanians from other publications are included
that percentage increases to 25.9%. By contrast, in Swahili language publications 89 % of
the articles were negative. Excluding the Islamic An-nuur, that percentage remains high
at 92 %. Mwananchi illustrates the English/Swahili dynamics well. Although owned by
the same company, Mwananchi’s articles were 100% negative whereas the English
language Citizen had 26% negative coverage.
The second resource used to assess Tanzanian perceptions and opinions of
AFRICOM was Jamii Forums, a Tanzanian discussion forum website. It is a widely
known website among Tanzanians and has over 100,000 registered members. The tagline
of Jamii Forums is “Where we dare to talk openly.” Because of Tanzania’s freedom of
press limitations, and the small number of people who participate in newspaper
publications, collecting date from this large news and discussion forum affords a more
comprehensive picture of Tanzanian perceptions and attitudes about AFRICOM.
To collect data from Jamii Forums a search for the word “AFRICOM” was done,
pulling up all discussion threads containing “AFRICOM” in their content. Each thread
was then read or, if there were hundreds of responses, searched for the words
“AFRICOM,” “Marekani,” and “jeshi” (“America” and “military” in Swahili and
English). Any comments which specifically referred to AFRICOM or activities for which
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it is responsible (such as military exercises) were collected and coded. The code used was
the same as that used for the newspaper data; positive, negative, neutral.
An example of a response that was coded as positive is,
“I always appreciate usa for their suportive nature, we use alot of chinese
inquality products with no any human support from them, for a long period joseph
cony in uganda killing our sisters and brothers no any arabic nation or china say
anything right now usa get in charge you start blaming usa. [sic]” (“Wamarekani
wanazidi kujikita kijeshi barani Africa,” 2011).
An example of a response that was coded as negative is,
“It has nothing to do with Al Shabaab. It has to do with AFRICOM, chase
away China and India, control, grab resources, recolonize Africa or better say
enslave Africans as they are used to it. Kill them, starve them and control them so
they fall in line with US-Western countries interests” (“Wamarekani wanazidi
kujikita kijeshi barani Africa,” 2011).
An example of a response that was coded as neutral is, (speaking about different
military structures) “they protect their border and inside their own country, it is also
different because they have commanders for AFRICOM in Africa” (trans)
(“Makomandoo wa Bongo,” 2011). For this data assessing neutrality was more of a
challenge than in newspapers, but was predominantly coded when a respondent asked a
clarifying question.
In initial discussions with Tanzanian professors about knowledge and perceptions
of AFRICOM in the general Tanzanian public, the author was told the general public
would have little knowledge and few opinions about AFRICOM. The number of
responses and their content on Jamii Forums strongly contradict these assertions.
Respondents on Jamii Forums generally demonstrated a strong interest in this topic and
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engaged in vigorous debates with one another over U.S. military and/or AFRICOM
involvement in Tanzania, and Africa in general.
A total of two hundred and thirty-five responses were collected and coded.
Positive responses constituted 10% of total responses, neutral 41%, and negative 49%.
Another aspect of this assessment was to record what was referenced by respondents in
their posts; either AFRICOM in Tanzania, another African state, or a general comment.
The purpose of tracking what respondents referenced was to see with what frequency
Tanzanians are concerned with the command vis a vis Tanzania specifically. The results
reinforce that the Tanzanian public is engaged with the topic of AFRICOM as it directly
relates to Tanzania, 36% of posts were about AFRICOM in Tanzania. Of the remaining
posts 12% referenced AFRICOM in another African state, predominantly focusing on
other East African states and the U.S. intervention in Libya. And 52% of posts were
general in nature, lacking a reference to a specific country, and focused on the theoretical
policy implications of the command.
Overall, the responses on Jamii Forums showed a greater balance between the
negative and neutral perspectives than newspaper coverage and there were also a higher
percentage of positive responses than in newspaper coverage. It is difficult to know
definitively why Jamii Forum respondents had a more balanced, and overall more
positive, view of AFRICOM. One possibility is the fact that the Tanzanian public has a
generally favorable view of the U.S. Research by the Pew Global Attitudes project in
2007 found 46% of Tanzanians had a favorable view of the U.S. and 49% favorability of
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U.S consideration for other countries interests. That percentage had increased to 65% by
2008 (“Tanzania: Opinion of the United States,” n.d.). Another factor could be Tanzanian
news source choices. Since it is common knowledge the Tanzanian government restricts
information regarding security issues it is possible many Tanzanians rely on outside,
primarily internet, news sources for information on U.S. and Tanzanian security policies,
potentially reducing negative perceptions of AFRICOM. Another possibility is
respondents on Jamii Forums represent the more educated and engaged policy elites in
Tanzania since participation on Jamii Forums would require access to a computer,
technology skills, and a more sophisticated knowledge of foreign and security policy.

Conclusion
“Tanzania is a peaceful country but there are many things below the surface and,
with the right spark, there could be chaos.” This remark a Tanzanian made to the author
highlights that the challenge for AFRICOM’s engagement in Tanzania is correctly
identifying, and subsequently addressing, those security issues which could either spark
or fuel instability. Tanzania has a wide array of security, including human security,
challenges with which to contend. The transnational issues of violent extremism, drug
trafficking, and piracy pose real threats to stability and security and cannot be
overlooked. Yet focusing on these issues alone ignores the everyday insecurity
Tanzanians face which, over time, compound into transnational threats and fuel internal
instabilities. Human insecurity constitutes the foundation of these transnational
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challenges, is the most prevalent in the lives of Tanzanians, and are indeed those which
most concern them.
The results of this analysis pertain specifically to research question three. As a
whole, AFRICOM does not foster a positive public perception of itself in Tanzania. The
results of the content analysis have several implications for AFRICOM. First, these
results show AFRICOM’s activities are, by and large, not resonating with the Tanzanian
population. As a whole, the views expressed also indicate there is skepticism that U.S.
security policy in Tanzania is really intended to benefit Tanzania or include it as an equal
partner. Therefore, the predominantly negative view in newspapers and somewhat
ambiguous view of AFRICOM on Jamii Forums suggests there is significant work to be
done in terms of the command’s public outreach and relations. The content analysis
results of the newspaper An-Nuur show this is particularly true in Tanzania’s Muslim
communities.
While some of the views expressed in either newspapers or Jamii Forums
indicate fundamental, and likely unalterable, philosophical opposition to the U.S.
military, many of the negative or ambivalent views were based off misinformation or a
lack thereof. The overwhelmingly negative view of AFRICOM in Swahili publications is
also instructive and is perhaps indicative that the command would benefit from doing
more outreach through Swahili language mediums. Although a stronger public outreach
effort to the Tanzanian public is unlikely to result in a sea change of public opinion,
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improving the command’s in-country communication strategy serves U.S. interests by
reducing the mistrust and suspicion created by a lack of information.
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Chapter Five
--Summary and Conclusion

This research fills a gap in the existing literature by contributing an in-depth
evaluation of AFRICOM in a single African state. This case study of Tanzania sought to
answer three questions: what is the impact of AFRICOM in executing U.S. national
security policy in Tanzania? How and to what extent has AFRICOM addressed the
conditions of human insecurity? And does AFRICOM foster a positive public perception
in Tanzania?

What is the impact of AFRICOM on executing U.S. national security policy in
Tanzania?
To answer the first question this research utilized interviews with U.S. officials
and personnel, publically available information about the command’s activities in
Tanzania, and detailed the most immediate human and tradition security challenges in
Tanzania. The fact that Tanzania willingly participates in almost all of the AFRICOM
security cooperation training programs and exercises for which it is eligible shows that
the command is effectively executing U.S. national security policy. Tanzania’s high level
of participation also signals a convergence in U.S. and Tanzanian threat perceptions,
reflecting that U.S. security policy actually does address security issues which the
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Tanzanian government finds important. In addition, the evidence from the interviews
indicates that AFRICOM is having a positive impact on bilateral relations because
Tanzania has seen the resources and attention it can leverage, and the merits of having a
single point of contact for the U.S. military. Cultivating strong bilateral ties is important
for both the current and future execution and success of U.S. national security policy.
Both of these have positive implications for U.S. security and strategic interests and
support the views of proponents of AFRICOM that it brings improved focus,
coordination, and resources to U.S. Africa policy.

To what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity in
Tanzania?
To answer the second question this research analyzed the command’s training
exercise activities in Tanzania and interview responses in relation to the background
analysis on the country’s security challenges. This analysis indicates that AFRICOM is
addressing human security issues, but these efforts and impacts are confined to the
Tanzanian military. AFRICOM’s primary means of engagement are through partner
security cooperation training and exercises with the Tanzanian military, and there was
some breadth to the command’s engagement, including training and exercises on
humanitarian crises, pandemics etc. Nonetheless, the table of AFRICOM’s training and
exercises with AFRICOM and interviews with officials familiar with the command’s
engagement with Tanzania revealed that the primary locus of concern for AFRICOM in
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its execution of U.S. security policy is more traditional security challenges. While partner
military capacity building is necessary, recent events in Mali underscore that it is
insufficient to ensuring stability, security, and preventing conflict.
Security in Tanzania is fundamentally about human security. The daily concerns
of ordinary Tanzanians are the country’s chronic poverty, education, and health systems
and the Tanzanian government has placed these issues at the top of its agendas.
AFRICOM’s current activities in Tanzania have minimal focus and impact on Tanzania’s
human security, the primary threats the country faces. Given that AFRICOM’s ultimate
objective is centered on conflict prevention, a broader approach will be essential if U.S.
national security policy is to successfully prevent instability and conflict.

What is the public perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public?
To answer the third question this research conducted a content analysis of Swahili
and English language newspapers and an online discussion forum in Tanzania, coding
articles and responses about AFRICOM based on attitudinal measures. The results of this
content analysis show that there is a high degree of engagement with the topic of
AFRICOM amongst the Tanzanian public. Overall public opinion of the command leans
negative, and is decidedly negative in Swahili language mediums.
The content analysis revealed that, overall, the Tanzanian public views
AFRICOM with suspicion. Their belief that AFRICOM, at best, is narrowly focused on
terrorism and, at worst, is using security as a guise for its neo-imperial ambitions shows
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that the command faces serious challenges regarding its activities and public image. A
highly plausible explanation for these views is misperception, stemming from both the
U.S. and Tanzania. From the Tanzanian side, the public’s misperception stems from a
lack of information regarding U.S. foreign policy, the means by which those policies are
executed, and their overall intent. Misperception on the part of the U.S. stems from a lack
of understanding the historic and contemporary undercurrents of Tanzania which shape
its public’s perceptions of insecurity and national interest, and then failing to configure
and execute U.S. policy in Tanzania accordingly. The prevalence of these negative views
highlights how crucial it is from both a security and diplomatic standpoint that
Tanzania’s human security threats remain a top priority for U.S. government efforts.
Indeed a former U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania stated, in reference to Tanzania,
“Development is the driving force of our diplomatic strength, but also who we are and
what we’re known for” (personal communication).

Conclusion
The evidence from this case study suggests that in Tanzania AFRICOM has
largely failed to achieve the articulated vision of a “combatant command plus.” This can
be attributed to a complex confluence of factors: interagency buy-in and capacity,
institutional culture, and the inherent limits of being a military organization. In the end,
AFRICOM is a military organization, inherently its functions are military in nature and
its primary counterpart will be another country’s military. The original articulations about
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the command and their emphasis on jointness and whole of government approaches are
not, in themselves, inherently problematic or incompatible within the constructs of a
military organization. Rather, this vision for AFRICOM stretched the command beyond
what the bounds of a military-military relationship allow. Not achieving the original
vision for the command also stems from more complicated realities surrounding civilian
capacity in the U.S. government, interagency incorporation into the command, and the
sources of AFRICOM’s funding. All of these factors directly impact AFRICOM’s ability
to carry out its whole of government modus operandi, engage in long term planning, and
calibrate its activities according to the needs of individual African states.
Critics of AFRICOM charge the command represents the militarization of U.S.
Africa policy. Indeed it is important for the U.S. military to be mindful of avoiding an
overreach in Africa, and to work in cooperation with African states; not simply pursuing
a one-dimensional concept of U.S. strategic interests. However, this criticism misses two
crucial points. First, this critique fails to acknowledge the fact that all aspects of U.S.
engagement in Africa have been on the rise, including humanitarian and development aid.
For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) represent a more extensive investment of
U.S. resources than AFRICOM. The MCC currently has fifteen compacts with African
states, totaling $5.8 billion and its ten threshold program grants in Africa total $160
million (“Africa,” n.d.). In its first four years (FY2004-FY2008) the Bush Administration
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spent $18.1 billion dollars in PEPFAR funds, making it the largest bi-lateral health
initiative in the world (Salaam-Blyther, 2012, p. 2).
By comparison, AFRICOM’s start-up budget in FY 2007 was $51 million and its
FY 2008 first year operating budget was approximately $154 million. Its FY2013 request
of $285 million represents the highest amount of funding to date (Ploch, 2011). The
funding of only two U.S. bi-lateral assistance programs (MCC and PEPFAR) eclipses
AFRICOM’s funding. Militarization would require a level of funding which exceeds and
overwhelms all other aspects of bi-lateral assistance. In the case of Tanzania,
development and health assistance constituted $506 million of the total $549 million of
U.S. bi-lateral assistance to Tanzania in FY 2011, with military and security related
funding receiving only $43 million (Dagne, 2010). Arguing AFRICOM represents a
militarization of U.S. Africa policy ignores the concurrent significant rise in funding for
U.S. humanitarian and development assistance programs for Africa.
Second, by arguing the U.S. is militarizing its Africa policy, critics posit a
reductionist view of the agency of African leaders to pursue the geo-strategic interests of
their states. Insisting U.S. Africa policy retain an ostensibly humanitarian and
development focus perpetuates a paternalistic view of Africa vis a vis the U.S. The U.S.
military is a central part of its foreign policy apparatus, and is a status quo aspect of U.S.
foreign relations. Engaging African states in broader strategic terms is an important step
in the normalization and maturation of U.S. relations in the region, as well as the rise of
African states in international politics. It is disingenuous to insist that African states stop
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being treated as humanitarian basket cases, then criticize evolutions which add dynamism
and broader forms of engagement to U.S. Africa policy.
Nonetheless, by failing to incorporate a more substantial whole of government
approach and to broaden its vision of security threats, AFRICOM’s execution of U.S.
national security policy in Tanzania falls short. The U.S. military cannot and should not
be expected to assume the responsibility for U.S. development and diplomacy in
Tanzania. But an exclusive focus on the Tanzanian military narrows the command’s
focus to the point where it has neglected to engage in other areas which have significant
bearing on security. Grappling with the whole of government approach and its dilemma’s
and tensions requires ongoing policy evaluation, informed by assessments of in-country
conditions. The challenge, then, for the U.S. military and interagency is to bridge this
divide; expanding the military’s capacity and scope while also ensuring that AFRICOM
is working within its purview in the wider U.S. government system. Broadening
AFRICOM’s scope of engagement beyond the counterpart country’s military demands
ongoing deliberative processes.
The analysis of AFRICOM’s in-country activities in Tanzania, including
programs and exercises, indicate that AFRICOM is more of a traditional combatant
command than articulated at its inception. As a more traditional combatant command,
AFRICOM emphasizes military-to-military partner capacity building and engagement as
a means to address security threats. This is in contrast to the founding vision of
AFRICOM as a revolutionary new interagency command, one which pursued
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development and human security objectives, and embodied the state building lessons of
Iraq and Afghanistan.
AFRICOM’s engagement with Tanzania is valuable and germane for state and
regional security and stability. Tanzania’s contribution of troops to the recently
authorized UN offensive combat force in Eastern Congo and a Tanzanian General being
named as the head of this regional offensive force illustrates the important, and growing,
peace and security role Tanzania plays in the region. Partner capacity building in states
not experiencing instability or conflict is critical to mitigating those issues when they
arise, both in the state and regionally, and preventing conflict recurrence. Tanzania’s role
in the UN offensive combat force is just one example of the necessity of its military
having the capacity to fulfill this role, and demonstrates the regional security dividends
from AFRICOM’s engagement and programs.
Ultimately this analysis found a disconnect between U.S. policy priorities and the
reality of the security threats on-the-ground. Though AFRICOM’s partner capacity
building with the Tanzanian military is important for state and regional security and is in
accordance with the wishes of the country’s leadership, many of Tanzania’s security
issues remain unaddressed by AFRICOM. More is required than building the military’s
capacity and focusing on the macro-level aspects of these threats. U.S. concerns over
piracy, terrorism, drug trafficking etc. should not be set aside but rather, left unaddressed,
the micro-level of these threats are persistent human insecurity. While interagency
personnel issues, funding, and restraints on the purview of the U.S. military mean it is
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unlikely that AFRICOM will become a whole of government combatant command, it
does need to have a greater emphasis on human security in Tanzania. Engaging in
security sector reform, specifically policy training, would be a means by which
AFRICOM could have a greater impact on human security while also addressing
transnational threats affecting U.S. interests, and stay in its institutional lane.
The selection of a case study approach for this research naturally leads to
questions of the merits and generalizability of such an approach and its conclusions. In
terms of merits, a probing case study afforded a more in-depth look at AFRICOM’s
impacts as well as a more thorough assessment of an African state in which the U.S. has
growing security and strategic interests than in the current literature. While it is both
difficult and ill advised to generalize the findings of this case study to all African states,
this research provides valuable insights regarding states similar to Tanzania. Therefore,
the generalizability of this case study’s findings most directly apply to tier-two countries
in Africa that the U.S. is working to cultivate stronger ties with and which have a
relatively good level of stability. Another area in which this research can be more broadly
generalized is in terms of AFRICOM’s public relations and outreach, the extent to which
those efforts impact public opinion. Perhaps the most important generalizable finding
from this case study is that the command, and U.S. policy in general, need to be
cognizant of the role local context and culture play when it comes to public opinion of
AFRICOM and the U.S. military.
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Limitations
There are some limitations to this assessment. The first relates to the content
analysis content reliability and the generalizability of the assessment. In regards to
content reliability, searches may not have resulted in every article from each newspaper
publication being found, potentially reducing the assessments accuracy. Many of the
newspaper articles were published within a fairly recent timeframe, usually only
stretching back to 2009. The second limitation is that this data comes from a small
sampling of Tanzanian newspapers, limiting the ability to assemble a comprehensive
picture of Tanzanian attitudes and make generalizations for the entire population of
Tanzania. However the fact that there are over three-hundred and fifty registered news
publications in Tanzania would make the time needed to go through each of them
prohibitively long.
Limitations of the social media content analysis mostly stem from the fact that
most of the responses were in Swahili which needed to be translated before being coded.
A native Swahili speaker was consulted when translation difficulties or questions arose to
minimize mistranslation and coding mistakes. Another limitation was knowing whether
or not a respondent was a Tanzanian. Though that information was unavailable, to
mitigate this issue coded responses were again coded regarding whether or not they
referred to Tanzania or other African states.
A second limitation relates to the ability to generalize about the impact of
AFRICOM on U.S. national security policy due to the fact that no Tanzanian government
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officials were interviewed. Tanzania has a much more closed approach to government
and security issues. Efforts were made to contact Tanzanian government officials, and
even a couple journalists, were unsuccessful and no one would grant an interview.
Therefore, interviews with U.S. officials were the only means to acquire attitudinal
information on the Tanzanian government’s views of AFRICOM, and the command’s
impact.

Further Research
The content analysis revealed a high degree of negativity towards AFRICOM in
the Tanzanian public. Islamic publications demonstrated even more extreme antagonisms
towards the command. Stemming from the results of this research, a point for further
research regarding AFRICOM in Tanzania would be an in-depth assessment of the
command’s public outreach strategy and efforts, particularly to Muslim communities
since they seemingly feel targeted by U.S. counter terror efforts. While these views may
not be alterable, it would be instructive to assess current U.S. outreach efforts to the
Tanzanian public and whether or not public outreach is considered an important
component for U.S. national security policy, its current impacts, and potential impact if
any aspects were to be altered. This research would require extensive interview work
throughout AFRICOM and various communities in Tanzania, particularly Muslim
communities. Further research into this area would be beneficial for understanding
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whether or not U.S. policy is shaped by and responsive to the opinions of the Tanzanian
public.
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